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INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, outer space law has moved from
the realm of science fiction to the realm of legal necessity. Intriguing commercial prospects have prompted an increased
number of governmental and private ventures into outer space
and have created a demand for expertise to define the legal parameters of such ventures.' The result has been the emergence
of a small but vigorous legal practice area 2 that combines a curious mix of international, administrative and business law. 3 This
field of law is likely to grow and its mixture of disciplines is likely
to become more diverse. As increasing numbers of humans work
and live in outer space, increased attention must be paid to the
rules governing their conduct and interactions. 4 Both practitionI See Edward Cohen, Launching a Legal Field, 246 Sci. 132 (1989).
2 Id.; Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Law in the 1990s: An Agenda for Research, 31
JURIMETRICS J. 1,

2-3 (1990).

3 For an overview of this emerging area, see GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P.
MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY (1989).
4 See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Space Colonization and the Law, 3 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 7 (1990) (discussing the need for rules in the face of expanding outer
space activity).
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ers and academic commentators are racing to define and resolve
the legal questions that are beginning to arise on this "final
frontier."

5

Many of the most crucial, yet largely unaddressed, legal
questions expected to arise in outer space law are those involving
the interaction of federal and state regulation. The United States
is a major player in the outer space arena; most American ventures to date, sponsored by the federal government, have occurred under the purview of federal law. The United States is a
federation, however, and federal law has always existed against
the backdrop of state law. Federal law has been called "interstitial, '"6 and even where a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme exists, state law is often expected to lend coherence to
the area. In other instances, the operation of state law would
conflict with federal interests, and state regulation is prohibited.
Defining the proper relationship between state and federal law
has never been a simple legal exercise, but it is likely to be important in the realm of space law, where federal regulation is sparse
and increasing numbers of private actors are entering the field.
This Article examines one area in which state law is well developed and federal law is non-existent: trade secret protection.
Because of the drive toward commercial use of outer space, trade
secrecy is likely to be a matter of concern in the near future. In
addition, a discussion of the application of trade secret law to
outer space activity may serve as a pattern for discussing the application of other areas of state law.
Part I of the Article reviews the recent move toward commercialization of outer space and notes the need for trade secret
protection to foster that trend. Because of the absence of any
federal provisions for trade secret protection, the application of
state trade secret law to outer space activity is explored as an alternative. This alternative may be hindered, however, by the preemptive effect of federal outer space patent legislation. Part II
describes the legal background necessary to an analysis of federal
5

See generally Richard DalBello, Jurisdiction, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law

Aboard the Space Station, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, THE LAW, AND THE COMMERCIAL
USE OF SPACE, Vol. III, 41, 41-42 (1987) [hereinafter AMERICAN ENTERPRISE]; U.S.
CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SPACE STATIONS AND THE LAW: SELECTED

LEGAL

ISSUES-BACKGROUND

GROUND PAPER].
6 See, e.g., Shell

PAPER

5 (1986) [hereinafter OTA

BACK-

Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 27 (1988);
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1972); Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
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preemption, including an overview of the purposes of patent and
trade secret law, the standards created by the United States
Supreme Court to determine preemption and the manner in
which these standards have been applied in matters of intellectual property protection. Part III then discusses the likely outcome when these standards are applied to commercial activity in
outer space, and suggests that the outcome is likely to be fraught
with contradictions and uncertainty. No simple legislative solution is likely to resolve this uncertainty; rather, federal courts will
have to play an active role in shaping and creating the law governing American ventures in outer space.
I.

COMMERCIAL

ACTIVITY

IN OUTER SPACE

Any discussion of the need for rules governing outer space
activity must be rooted in the events giving rise to that need.

Some general rules for outer space conduct are already in place,
but this framework was erected many years ago, and may not be
well suited to the present situation. The most drastic change in
recent outer space activity has been the diversification of that activity. Rather than the traditional dominance of the United States
and the Soviet Union, the field has seen the entry of new
spacefaring nations, some decline in the influence of one superpower and the disappearance of the other. These changes reflect
the rise of economic forces as a major factor in international activity; in space as on earth, commercialization and privatization
are becoming the new order.

A.

Commercialization and Privatization

Until recently, in the United States the federal government
held a virtual monopoly over outer space activity. Over the last
decade, however, the government has relinquished its hold on
such activity and instead has encouraged private sector involvement in outer space. 7 This process of privatization began under
the Reagan Administration with the announcement of a policy to
foster increased outer space activity by attracting private invest-

ment.8 The policy was implemented through a program of statu7 See Steven H. Flajser, Tax Law and Business Investments in Space, in AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE, supra note 5, at 91, 92-94; Dennis J. Helfman, Patentsin Space: Encourag-

ing and ProtectingOut-of-This-World Investments, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, supra note 5,

at 115, 116-17.
8 See Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union (Jan. 25, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 87, 90 [hereinafter State of
the Union Address] (discussing private sector space incentives); Ronald Reagan,
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tory and regulatory changes that altered or eliminated provisions
that would discourage commercial space activities, enacted new
provisions designed to encourage such ventures and privatized
many government-dominated outer space activities. 9
The Bush Administration renewed this policy with the promulgation of a national space policy that affirmed a commitment
to permanent manned presence in space, including a low earth
orbit space station and eventual construction of a lunar base.'0
The Bush Administration proposed to attain these goals by capturing the economic benefits of outer space activity through encouragement of private-sector investment in outer space
activity." Such investment was to be encouraged by transferring
government space technology to the private sector and by making any unused capacity of government space facilities available
to the private sector.' 2 In addition, the Bush space policy was
committed to increased governmental use of private-sector capacity and to joint ventures between government and private sectors. 1 3 Thus, government agencies were encouraged to act as

"anchor tenants" to make commercial space ventures viable in
the short term, but with a long-term view toward service of nongovernmental customers. 14
The Reagan and Bush administrations' space policies have
already opened the way to establishing private investment in a
variety of space-based services, including burgeoning markets in
satellite communications, commercial space launch services and
remote sensing services. 15 Such space-related activities are exRemarks at a White House Ceremony Marking the 15th Anniversary of the Apollo
11 Lunar Landing (July 20, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS at 1066-67 (same).
9 See Flajser, supra note 7.
10 See George Bush, Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon
Landing (July 20, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 990, 991.
'1 See National Space Policy, November 2, 1989 (copy on file with the author); see
also White House Fact Sheet on the National Space Policy (Nov. 16, 1989), in 1989 PUB.
PAPERS 1531.
12 See Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon Landing, supra
note 10; National Space Policy, supra note 11, at 6-9; U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines, February 12, 1991 (copy on file with the author); see also Statement by Press
Secretary Fitzwater on United States Commercial Space Policy Guidelines (February 12, 1991), 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 167.
13 See National Space Policy, supra note 11, at 3; National Space Council 1990 Report to
the President 25-26 (1990).
14 See U.S. Commercial Space Policy Guidelines, supra note 12, at 5.
15 See Helfman, supra note 7, at 116-23; NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE: A NEW ECONOMIC STRENGTH FOR
AMERICA 8-18. Executive branch support of outer space commercialization is likely
to continue under the newly-elected Clinton administration. Vice-President Albert
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pected to generate $100-200 billion in annual revenues by the
year 2000.16 The most alluring promise of outer space commercialization, however, appears to lie in the area of materials
processing, where the unique environment of earth orbit might
be exploited to enhance scientific research and industrial
processes. 7 The promise of a permanent human presence in
space carries with it the possibility of permanent outer space research and manufacturing facilities. The economic benefit that
may flow from such facilities has become increasingly apparent
from recent experiments conducted in low earth orbit.
1. Microgravity research
Although the environment in outer space is sometimes casually described as "weightless," very slight gravitational forces are
still measurable. 18 The effects of such microgravity are often
negligible, however, and sensitive scientific processes that would
be disrupted in Earth's strong gravitational field yield startling
results in low orbit. For example, a microgravity environment
has proven to greatly enhance biochemical studies of protein
structure.' 9 Large, regular crystals of a given protein are central
to determining the structure of that protein in x-ray diffraction
studies.20 On Earth, strong gravitational effects tend to produce
convection currents in the solution where crystals are grown;
these currents disrupt the orderly growth of the crystals, producing flawed or very tiny crystals. 21 Recent experiments performed
aboard the United States space shuttle have produced large, wellordered protein crystals because of the absence of strong graviGore, during his tenure in the Senate, sponsored a variety of initiatives related to
outer space commercialization, including the Patents in Space Act; Gore has been
designated to formulate the new administration's science and industrial policy. See
generally Wil Lepowski, Science-Technology Policy: Clinton Victory Will Mean Vast Changes,
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 9, 1992, at 4.
16 See David Osborne, Business in Space, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1985, reprinted in Patents in Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, 51
(1985) [hereinafter 1985 Hearing].
17 See NationalSpace Council 1990 Report to the President, supra note 13, at 21; CoMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE, supra note 15, at 14.
18 See Reynolds & Merges, supra note 3, at 13-14.
19 See Lawrence J. DeLucas, Protein Crystal Growth in Microgravity, 246 SCI. 651
(1989).
20 For an overview of x-ray diffraction studies of protein structure, see Dan L.
Burk, Application of United States Patent Law to Commercial Activity in Outer Space, 6
SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 295, 302-304 (1991).
21 See Robert Pool, Zero Gravity Produces Weighty Improvements, 246 Sci. 580 (1989).
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tational interference.22 The crystals produced in microgravity
have proven valuable in x-ray diffraction studies of the proteins
23
crystallized.
Microgravity experiments are also becoming important in
understanding the fundamental forces in many physical and biological processes. When the influence of strong gravity is removed, important physical influences that might have gone
unnoticed on Earth are revealed. For example, experiments performed in microgravity are fostering new insight into the fluid
dynamics of both experimental and living systems. 24 Electrophoretic separation of biological materials was thought to be limited
by gravitational effects when performed on Earth.2 5 The limitations on such separations, however, did not disappear when they
were performed in space, indicating a need to rethink certain
fundamental assumptions regarding the physics of the process.2 6
By contrast, the growth of living cells appears to be profoundly
affected by fluid dynamics generated by gravity; in comparison to
normal cells, cells grown in microgravity have decreased biological activity and loosely packed cellular material. 2 7
2.

Orbital manufacturing

Outer space experimentation of the sort described above is
already yielding new knowledge, and some of this basic research
will likely be applied to change manufacturing processes on
Earth.28 Such experiments, however, may also pave the way for
unique manufacturing processes carried out in outer space itself.
Although the precise character of the improved materials that
may be produced in outer space is still somewhat speculative, the
22 See DeLucas, supra note 19; see also Patents in Space: Hearingon H.R. 2946 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration ofJustice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearing]

(statement of Dr. Charles E. Bugg, Director, Center for Macromolecular Crystallography, University of Alabama at Birmingham).
23 See DeLucas, supra note 19.
24 See Richard Everett, YCC Gets Spaced Out, AM. CHEM. SOC. YOUNG CHEMISTS
CoMM. NEWSL., (American Chemical Society, Washington, D.C.) Spring 1991, at 7;
Stu Borman, Chemical Engineering: Ready for Space, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS,
March 18, 1991, at 16; Biochemist Studies Crystal Growth on Space Shuttle, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS, August 19, 1991, at 7.
25 See Everett, supra note 24.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE, supra note 15, at 4.
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results of initial investigations are promising. 29
For example, the same microgravity properties that allow enhanced formation of protein crystals are likely to allow improvements in the production of other types of crystals, such as silicon
or gallium arsenide crystals for semiconductor manufacture.3 0 In
addition, manufacture of metal composites or alloys may be enhanced in space because a microgravity environment will allow
better distribution of the materials forming the composite. 3 1
Materials of different densities, which would separate during
processing in Earth's gravitational field, will remain suspended
during melting and solidification in microgravity.3 2 Finally, a
microgravity environment offers the prospect of processing
materials without a physical container; such processing would
avoid problems of contamination and nucleation from contact
with the container surface.3 3
Outer space manufacturing may also lend itself to culturing
of human tissues and organs.34 Culturing of animal cells in the
laboratory is a mainstay technology of current biomedical research.3 5 When cells are cultured under artificial conditions,
however, they tend to form flattened layers unlike the three dimensional structures that are found in living organisms.3 6 This
effect is due in part to the press of gravity, which in nature is
offset by the buoyancy of a fluid-filled womb.37 Research is hampered by using cells that have grown in a form so unlike their
natural condition, but recent work by National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) researchers has led to the creation
of a bioreactor mechanism that partially overcomes gravitational
effects.3 When used in a microgravity environment, the bi29

See

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SPACE COMMERCE: AN INDUS-

TRY ASSESSMENT 97 (1988).
30 See SPACE COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 105; see also Borman, supra note 24.

31
32
33
34

See
See
See
See

Everett, supra note 24; SPACE COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 100.
SPACE COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 99.
id.
Tim Beardsley, Shear Bliss, ScI. AM., Feb. 1992, at 27.

35

See generally BRUCE

ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL

160-63

(2d ed. 1989) (discussing cell culture techniques).
36 Id.
37 See Kathy Sawyer, Growing Spare Partsfor People in Space, WASHINGTON POST,
November 18, 1991, at A3; Beardsley, supra note 34.
38 Sawyer, supra note 37, at A3. The NASA bioreactor is already in demand because it produces superior cell cultures even on Earth. Id. The bioreactor can only
partially counter the effect of strong gravity on cell culturing, however. Id. The full
benefit of this process will not be realized until the bioreactor is used in the setting
for which it was designed: aboard the proposed space station Freedom. Id. See also
infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
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oreactor promises to allow scientists to reproduce the three dimensional structure of natural tissues, perhaps including the
production of replacement organs formed in an outer space
"womb."

9

For the present, the products of microgravity processing are
somewhat less exotic than human organs or novel alloys but still
reflect the unique qualities of such manufacture. Microscopic
polystyrene beads manufactured aboard the United States space
shuttle are already available for sale. 40 Because of its origin in
microgravity, each bead is a perfect sphere 10 microns in diameter; the beads are useful as references for counting red blood
cells, measuring particulate air pollution or calibrating certain
sensitive machines. 4 1
3.

Multinational ventures

The promise of commercial opportunities in outer space has
sparked interest not only in the United States, but in other nations as well. Traditionally, outer space exploration has been
dominated by the United States and the former Soviet Union; the
massive space programs sponsored by these nations have been
driven primarily by political and military factors, with some consideration for scientific interests.4 2 The shift toward an emphasis
on space exploration for commercial opportunities, however, has
attracted the interest of new players, including Japan and a consortium of European nations, all eager to develop the unique
economic opportunities
available from outer space research and
43
manufacturing.
39 "The bottom line is: I think it's possible to grow organs [for implant in
humans] in space - theoretically. I don't want to sound like a way-out kook, and I
know this is far in the future. But that is the ultimate utility of this kind of biotechnology." Sawyer, supra note 37, at A3 (quotingJ. MilburnJessup, Harvard Medical
School).

40 SPACE COMMERCE,
41

supra note 29, at 100.

See Osborne, supra note 16, at 45, 51.

42 The secondary status of scientific interests remains as true as ever. For example, it has become increasingly clear that the research value of the proposed space
station will be less than that of many less expensive space research ventures, such as
unmanned probes or experiment packages. See Eliot Marshall, Starving Science to

Feed Space Station, 252 Sci. 1483 (1991); Eliot Marshall, Slimmer Station Wins White

House Approval, 251 ScI. 1556 (1991). The current administration has emphasized,
however, that the space station program will continue because of its political value,
rather than its scientific value. Id. at 1556, 1557.
43 See COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE, supra note 15, at 7, 16; SPACE COMMERCE,
supra note 29, at 80; see also Eddie Scuderi, Space and the Law of Intellectual Property, 63
LAw INST. J. 492 (1989) (discussing legal questions arising from proposed launch

facility in Australia).
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a. Internationalprograms
The European Space Agency (ESA) constitutes one of the
most ambitious and successful programs among the more recent
entries into the space race. Bankrolled by a consortium of thirteen European nations, spearheaded by the major economic
powers of Germany and France, ESA has already fostered an
enormously profitable commercial launch industry that has captured fifty percent of the world commercial satellite launch market.4 4 The European launch system, Ariane, was in fact the only
commercial launcher available in the free world when the American space shuttle flights were canceled after the Challenger disaster.45 Projects now underway for the ESA include development
of a shuttle-like orbiter, called Hermes, and a space station research module, called Columbus.4 6 Although portions of this ambitious space program have been delayed due to the massive cost
of German reunification,4 7 ESA is expected to continue as a
leader in space activity.
Similarly, Japan, another major world economic power, has
begun to turn its attention to activity in outer space. 4 8 By com-

parison to leading spacefaring nations, Japan's outer space
budget is modest, due in part to the absence of any Japanese military budget that might assume a share of the cost of developing
space technology.49 Unlike American space policy, Japanese
space policy has been fueled almost entirely by the possibility of
commercial success, rather than by political goals of space leadership.5 o TheJapanese have followed the same strategy for space
technology that has been successful in other industrial enterprises: identify the world leader in technology, learn from that
nation and then capitalize upon that knowledge to build a strong
native industry.5 1 Consequently, much ofJapan's space program,
through the present, has been "piggybacked" on that of the
44 See Richard Sietmann & Peter Coles, High Aoon for Europe's Space Plans, 54 Sci.
366, 366 (1991).
45 See id. at 366; Glenn H. Reynolds & Robert P. Merges, Toward An Industrial
Policy for Outer Space: Problems and Prospects of the Commercial Launch Industry, 29
JURIMETRICS J. 7 (1988).
46 See Sietmann & Coles, supra note 44, at 366.
47 Id.; Steven Dickman, Europe's Space Plans on Hold, 254 Sci. 1289 (1991).
48 See John M. Logsdon, U.S.-Japanese Space Relations at a Crossroads, 255 Sci. 294
(1992).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 296.
51 Id. at 297.
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United States.5 2 TheJapanese, however, are currently pushing to
acquire space technology independence by developing their own
launch systems.53
The multinational and collaborative features of these burgeoning space programs typify the growing trend in outer space
projects, particularly where commercial results are expected. For
example, the United States and ESA have recently collaborated
on a series of missions involving the United States space shuttle
and a laboratory module built by ESA. 54 This Spacelab module,
designed to be carried in the Shuttle hold, enabled scientists
from various nations to conduct pressurized and unpressurized
microgravity experiments of the type described above.55 Such
collaborative projects allow the United States to spread the high
cost of outer space research, while allowing its partner nation to
benefit from the United States' leading space technology.
Such benefits have not been limited to partnerships with the
United States. For example, an American company, Payload Systems, contracted to conduct protein crystallization experiments
aboard the Soviet MIR space station.56 The space program
funded by the former Soviet Union accrued considerable proficiency in areas of space technology critical to outer space development, most notably in relation to orbital space stations. In
the final years of the Soviet nation, use of these facilities was increasingly offered to Western collaborators, particularly the
French.58 Joint space projects with the United States were also
planned during meetings between Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev.59 The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, has
probably suspended such collaborative projects for the foreseeable future. Recent events in the territories formerly controlled
by the Soviet Union have left the control of Soviet launch facilities in doubt, 60 and the heirs to the Soviet space legacy now ap52

Id.

53 Id. at 298.
54 See International Crew Studies Microgravity in Space, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS,

Jan. 27, 1992, at 5 (discussing recent Spacelab mission).

55 See SPACE COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 84-85, 102.

See id. at 87.
In contrast to the United States' relatively short missions, Soviet cosmonauts
gained extensive experience in living and working in microgravity environments,
spending up to 11 months at a time aboard the MIR space station. See id.
58 Id.
59 See Richard Seltzer, U.S.-Soviet Space Research Expanded, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, August 12, 1991, at 24.
60 The launch center at Baikonur is located in the breakaway republic of Kazakhstan. Dickman, supra note 47.
56
57
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pear likely to auction off much of the space program's hardware,
including the MIR station, to Western buyers to raise much
6
needed hard currency. '
b.

Space station Freedom

Perhaps the most prominent of the multinational ventures
now under consideration is the proposed space station Freedom.
This project was initiated as part of the Reagan Administration
space initiative and included an invitation for other nations to
participate. 62 Nine of the thirteen ESA nations, together with Japan and Canada, have joined in the project.6" This international
consortium will be reflected both in the personnel aboard the
station and in the structure of the station itself.64 Partner nations
will provide an international crew of four persons that will occupy the completed station in four to six month rotations. 65 Additionally, different nations from the consortium will
provide
66
structure.
station
space
the
of
components
different
As originally envisioned, the station was to consist of four
interconnected habitable modules, together with a latticework
truss structure extending from the module core and several freeflying space platforms. 67 Budgetary constraints in the United
States and Europe have forced some reductions in the size and
operations of this original plan, but the overall concept has remained the same. 68 The United States is to provide two of the
habitable modules. 69 Access to the station will also be provided
by the United States via the space shuttle.70 A third module,
See Rockets for Sale, 255 Sci. 1209 (1992).
See State of the Union Address, supra note 8.
See Mary B. McCord, Note, Responding to the Space Station Agreement: The Extension of U.S. Law into Space, 77 GEO. L.J. 1933, 1933-34 (1989); David C. Stewart,
Note, Resolution of Legal Issues Confronting the InternationalSpace Station Project: A Step
Forwardin the Development of Space Law, 29 VA.J. INT'L L. 745, 746 (1989); R. Oosterlinck, The IntergovernmentalAgreement and Intellectual Property Rights, 17 J. SPACE L. 23,
23-24 (1989).
64 See McCord, supra note 63, at 1938-39; Stewart, supra note 63, at 746-48; Oosterlinck, supra note 63, at 24-25.
65 See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 3.
66 Id.
61
62
63

67 MARCIA B. SMITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF: SPACE STATIONS 4 (October 6, 1989) [hereinafter CRS ISSUE BRIEF].
68 See Eliot Marshall, Slimmer Station Wins White House Approval,

251 SCI. 1556
(1991).
69 See CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 67; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at
3.
70 See Eliot Marshall, Space Station Science: Up in the Air, 246 ScI. 1110, 1110-11
(1989).
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called the Columbus module, is to be provided by ESA, as are two
of the free-flying platforms to be associated with the station. 7'
The final module, the Japanese Experimental Module, will be
built by Japan and will provide both pressurized compartments
and compartments exposed to outer space.72 In addition, a
fourth member of the multinational consortium, Canada, will
provide a robotic arm to be deployed as part of the truss structure.7 ' Although the station's multinational structure capitalizes
on the benefits of each partner's technological expertise, it also
forms the basis for a potentially tangled legal regime. 4
B.

The Legal Milieu

International law, derived from several different sources, primarily governs the interaction of spacefaring nations. 75 First, the
activities of the many entities now operating in outer space are
subject to the principles set out in a system of international treaties. 76 Second, customary international law may subject the
spacecraft or the citizens of various nations to the laws of those
particular nations. Third, individual nations may have entered
into treaties or agreements among themselves that bind the signatories to a particular set of laws. Each of these bodies of law
plays an important role in assessing the rules that govern outer
space activity.
1.

International treaties

The principal treaty governing the conduct of outer space
operations, carrying the imposing title of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, is generally known simply as the Outer Space Treaty.7 7
Three subsequent treaties clarify and implement various provisions of the Outer Space Treaty dealing with registration of
79
space objects, 78 liability for damage caused by space objects
71 See CRS ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 67; OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at

3.
72

See Logsdon, supra note 48, at 299.

73 See Marshall, supra note 70.
74

See OTA

BACKGROUND PAPER,

supra note 5, at 5.

75 Id. at 15.

Id.
October 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer
Space Treaty].
78 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Septem76
77
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and the rescue of astronauts."0
These treaties operate against a backdrop of customary international law that specifies the bases on which nations may assert jurisdiction over a given matter. In general, nations assert
legal jurisdiction based on territoriality, i.e., over matters occurring within their borders.8" Nations may also claim jurisdiction
based on nationality, i.e., over their own citizens whether within
the nation's borders or not. 2 Occasionally, nations may also
seek jurisdiction over acts committed by anyone, anywhere, when
those acts affect the nation's security or integrity, or are univer3
sally recognized as crimes.1

As a general rule, the treaties that govern outer space activity eschew territoriality and instead declare principles of openness and accessibility to space. The Outer Space Treaty
mandates that the use of outer space be open to all nations, and
that no nation may claim sovereignty over any portion of outer
space.84 The treaty also encourages international cooperation in
assuring scientific freedom in outer space; to this end, nations are
to report the nature, conduct and results of space explorations to
the Secretary General of the United Nations who will in turn
widely disseminate the information. 5
Nationality, rather than territoriality, generally takes the lead
in determining jurisdiction over outer space activity. This approach is primarily implemented through a system of international registry. The Outer Space Treaty, together with the
Convention on Registry of Objects Launched Into Outer Space,
declares that nations retain jurisdiction and control over space
objects of their registry.8 6 These treaties also specify that ownerber 15, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration
Convention].
79 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
October 9, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
80 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, December 3, 1968, 19 U.ST. 7570,
T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
81 See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 25-26 n.38 (citing S. Houston
Lay & Howard J. Taubenfeld, THE LAw RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE
(1970)); Glenn H. Reynolds, Legislative Comment: The Patents in Space Act, 3 HARV.J. L.
& TECH. 13, 18 (1990); 1989 Hearing,supra note 22, at 47-48 (statement of Glenn
H. Reynolds, Associate Professor, College of Law, University of Tennessee).
82 For further discussion on this point, see supra note 81.
83 Id.
84 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 77, at art. II.
85 Id. at art. I, XI.
86 See id. at art. VIII; Registration Convention, supra note 78, at art. II.
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ship of objects does not change simply because they are launched
into outer space.87 Additionally, the Outer Space Treaty, together with the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, provides that nations are
responsible for damage caused by their nationals or by space objects on their registry."'
These principles leave the jurisdictional character of outer
space open to some dispute. Under one legal theory, outer space
is classified as res nullius, freely appropriable for use by first comers.8 ' A different school of thought, primarily espoused by developing nations that lack access to outer space, maintains that
outer space is res communis, or the common heritage of mankind." °
Under this theory, any use of outer space would require international community approval and must be for the benefit of all nations.9 ' The United States has endorsed a position between
these two extremes. 2 The former seems incompatible with the
overall scheme of the applicable outer space treaties; like Antarctica or international waters, outer space cannot be permanently
appropriated for the exclusive use of any nation." The latter
theory seems incompatible with private development of outer
space opportunities because no incentive would exist to invest in
activities if others who did not invest would reap the benefits. 4
Rather, the United States has adopted a position of freedom of
space for use by all, under which no nation may permanently
claim any portion of outer space, though a nation may engage in
the use of outer space if it does so with respect for other nations.95 Under this approach, entities that expend resources and
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 77, at art. VIII.
Id. at art. VII; Liability Convention, supra note 79.
See Fred Kosmo, Note, The Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory Scheme that
Promotes Commercial Ventures and InternationalResponsibility, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055,
1073-74 (1988).
90 Id. at 1074.
91 See id. at 1073-74.
92 See Helfman, supra note 7, at 133.
93 See Helen Shin, Note, "Oh I have slipped the surly bonds of earth ". Multinational
Space Stations and Choice of Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1379-82 (1990). The analogy
between outer space and the high seas is a familiar feature of outer space law and
may be a useful approach if used with some caution. See generally Hamilton DeSaussure, Astronauts and Seamen -A Legal Comparison, 10 J. SPACE L. 165 (1982); Hamilton DeSaussure, Maritime and Space Law: Comparisons and Contrasts, 9J. SPACE L. 933
(1981).
94 See Kosmo, supra note 89, at 1067.
95 See S. REP. No. 266, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4061, 4062; see also Kosmo, supra note 89, at 1074; Helfman, supra
note 7, at 133.
87
88
89
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take risks to develop outer space opportunities should reap the
benefit of resulting profits and technical discoveries. 96
2.

The Intergovernmental Agreement

Where space station Freedom is concerned, an additional
layer of legal standards will arise from the Intergovernmental
Agreement (the IGA) signed by the participants.97 In accordance
with the Outer Space Treaty and other international agreements
discussed above, the IGA designates jurisdiction almost exclusively by means of nationality principles.98 The IGA provides
that each participant nation shall retain jurisdiction and control
over the space objects on its registry and that each participant
nation shall have jurisdiction over its own nationals. 99 Some
commentators have construed the first of these provisions as a
concession to territoriality, according jurisdiction to each participant over the "territory" of its particular module.100 This type of
"territoriality" is primarily a legal metaphor, however.' 0 ' With
regard to ships on the high seas, the United States Supreme
Court has observed that " [t]he jurisdiction which [this metaphor]
is intended to describe arises out of the nationality of the ship, as
established by her domicile, registry and use of the flag, and partakes more of the characteristics of personal than of territorial
sovereignty."

' 2

Much the same may be said of spacecraft

outside of Earth's atmosphere; because of the scheme of international treaties discussed above, no territorial sovereignty orjurisdiction exists in outer space, only registry and personal
jurisdiction."'
The potential blend ofjurisdiction by module and individual
has been termed, with some justification, "probably unwise."' 0 4
The scheme promises to generate a bewildering array of potential jurisdictional claims as nationals from any given participating
See Kosmo, supra note 89, at 1067, 1085.
Agreement on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation,
and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, September 29,
1988 [hereinafter Intergovernmental Agreement] (on file at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters Library, Washington, D.C.).
98 See McCord, supra note 63, at 1939.
99 See Intergovernmental Agreement, supra note 97, at art. 1.
100 See McCord, supra note 63, at 1940.
101 See Reynolds, supra note 81, at 21-24; Burk, supra note 20, at 319-26.
102 Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923).
103 See Bin Cheng, The Commercial Development of Space: The Need for New Treaties, 19
J. SPACE L. 17, 41 (1991).
104 Stewart, supra note 63, at 754.
96
97

576

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:560

country move from module to module, any of which may be on a
different participant's registry. 10 5 The jurisdictional melange
may prove particularly troublesome for determining ownership
and control of industrial or scientific research results, as researchers of a given nationality are unlikely to confine their research activities to their nation's
module, but rather will be using
10 6
facilities in all the modules.

Neither do the IGA's additional provisions on criminal law,
tort liability and intellectual property rights appear to offer any
certainty that would simplify possible disputes as to control over
new discoveries. Indeed, many of the provisions appear to further complicate the matter. The tort provisions provide a crosswaiver of liability, but provide that the cross-waiver does not extend to intellectual property claims. 10 7 The intellectual property
provisions of the agreement provide that activity occurring on
board a given module will be deemed to have occurred in the
territory of the nation on whose registry the module is carried. 0 ,
For the Columbus module, any ESA member may consider the activity to have occurred in its territory, further complicating the
station's jurisdictional patchwork. 0 9
Although most commentators have discussed the IGA intellectual property provisions only as related to patents, 110 the
agreement's definition of "intellectual property" is probably
broad enough to include other types of protection, such as trade
secrets. During the negotiation of the agreement, the definition
of intellectual property found in Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
was adopted."' That definition includes "protection against unfair competition, and all other rights resulting from intellectual
activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields."' 12
This IGA provision is likely to be especially important to contin105 See DalBello, supra note 5, at 47-48; Charles B. Meyer, Protecting Inventor Rights
Aboard an International Space Station, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 332, 343
(1988).
106 See Meyer, supra note 105.
107 See Intergovernmental Agreement, supra note 97, at art. 16, para. 3, subpara.
d.
108 See id. at art. 21, para. 2.

109 Id.

110 See, e.g., McCord, supra note 63, at 1951-53; Oosterlinck, supra note 63, at 2627.
111 Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July
14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO Convention]; see also
Stewart, supra note 63, at 756; Oosterlinck, supra note 63, at 25-26.
112 WIPO Convention, supra note 111, at art. 2 (viii).
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ued private investment in space, but only if some definitional
framework is provided for its implementation.
3.

Patent protection

The uncertainty in the intellectual property provisions of the
Freedom IGA may prove troublesome for space station participants hoping to profit from outer space commercialization. The
mainstay of the commercialization movement is investment by
private business entities, but these firms may be reluctant to invest in outer space ventures if the potential profits are uncertain. 113 Commercial space ventures are already known to be
capital intensive and high risk, with an uncertain payback period.'"' Intellectual property rules, particularly the availability of
patents, have been suggested as important tools to reassure
outer space investors that their speculation carries a reasonable
chance of making money." 5 The availability of intellectual property law for outer space has, however, posed a series of legal
challenges.
a.

"Floating island"jurisdiction

Although a comprehensive federal patent scheme exists in
the United States, the application of these laws to outer space
ventures has been a question of concern because of language in
the patent statutes. Many provisions of the patent law provide
that they are applicable to activities in the "United States" or in
"this country." ' "1 6 The definitional section of the patent laws
specifies that these terms refer to "the United States of America,
its territories and possessions.""' The Supreme Court had accordingly held that United States patent law generally lacks an
extraterritorial effect.' 8 Given the international character of
outer space, which denies any territorial claim, these statutory
113 See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 5-6; Meyer, supra note 105, at
333, 345.
114 See SPACE COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 91, 92, 111.
115 See, e.g., 1985 Hearing,supra note 16, at 14-15 (statement of Donald S. Chisum,
Professor, University of Washington Law School); Statement on Signing the Bill Ensuring the Applicability of Patent Law to Activities in Outer Space, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1828 (Nov. 19, 1990).
116 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 271(a) (1988); see also 1985 Hearing, supra note 16,
at 16-19 (testimony of Donald S. Chisum, Professor, University of Washington Law
School) (discussing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 271 (a) as applied to outer space activity).
117 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (1988).
118 See Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
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provisions have made extension of United States patent laws to
outer space a doubtful legal proposition.
One proposed analysis of the question of outer space patents indicated that no problem existed at all, because United
States spacecraft were in some sense equivalent to United States
territory. 1 9 This view was based primarily on the holdings of
certain older patent cases that considered American ships on the
highs seas as "floating islands" of United States territory for purposes of the patent law. 120 According to these cases, "[patent]
jurisdiction extends to the decks of American vessels on the high
seas, as much as it does to all the territory of the country ....
The same principle, it was argued, could be extended to Ameri22
can spacecraft. 1

More recent patent cases, however, have indicated that the
courts were uncomfortable with the notion of "floating island"
jurisdiction. 23 As one court stated, "a decision founded on the
fiction that for purposes of the Patent Laws, United States ships
and planes wherever found are United States territory, would be
founded on water."'' 24 In addition, this legal theory had been explicitly rejected in areas other than patent law. The United States
Supreme Court in particular had stressed that the jurisdictional
character of ships derives more from registry than from territoriality.' 25 Consequently, although the application of the "floating
island" theory to United States spacecraft might lead to the correct result, there was little surety that courts would in fact employ
26
such a problematic doctrine.

119 See Harry M. Saragovitz, The Law of Intellectual Property in Outer Space, 17 IDEA
86 (1975) (suggesting this rationale for spacecraft).
120 See Gardiner v. Howe, 9 F. Cas. 1157 (C.C.D. Mass. 1865) (No. 5219); Marconi Wireless Tele. Co. of America v. United States, 53 U.S.P.Q. 246 (Ct. CI. 1942)
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 320 U.S. 1 (1943). See also Brown v. Duchesne,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856) (holding that French patent law applied to a French
ship in an American port).
121 Gardiner, 9 F. Cas. at 1158.
122 See Saragovitz, supra note 119.
123 See Ocean Science & Engineering, Inc. v. United States, 595 F.2d 572 (Ct. CI.
1979); Decca Ltd. v. United States, 191 U.S.P.O 439 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
124 Decca, 191 U.S.P.Q at 442; accord Ocean Science Engineering, 595 F.2d at 574
("[T]he constitutional power of Congress to make our patent laws applicable to
processes carried out on U.S. flag ships and planes at sea is not challenged; the
question is whether Congress has done so .... ").
125 See United States ex rel. Clausen v. Day, 279 U.S. 389 (1929); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); Scharrenberg v. Dollar Steamship Co., 245
U.S. 122 (1917).
126 See Reynolds, supra note 81, at 24-25.
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b. Statutory jurisdiction
As an alternative to "floating island" theories, Congress was
urged to clarify the patent law by explicitly stating that the law
extends to activities aboard United States spacecraft. 127 Legislation to this effect was introduced under the title of the Patents in
Space Act, as early as 1985.128 Although the bill enjoyed widespread support from government, industry and the international
1 29
community, Congress took until 1990 to enact the bill.
The Patents in Space bill was reintroduced each year during
the interim, and each version contained small but important textual changes. 130 Many of the revisions made in the language of
the Act prior to its enactment were calculated to accommodate
the legislation to the milieu of the space station Freedom. 13' In
particular, the Act's language was altered to avoid offending the
interests of the United States' international partners. For example, nations involved in the station project expressed concern
that because of the United States' dominance in the project, language in the legislation extending United States patent law to
space objects under the "jurisdiction or control" of the United
32
States might affect modules on the registry of other nations.'
In response to this concern, certain exclusionary language was
incorporated into the Act's final form. 133 Such alterations were
considered crucial to avoid offending the sovereignty of partner
nations. 134
4.

Trade secret protection

Enactment of the Patents in Space Act has constituted a major step toward resolving questions of intellectual property protection for outer space activity. Even though the patent question
has been clarified, there still remains a large gap in the range of
127 See, e.g., 1989 Hearing,supra note 22, at 9 (testimony of Robert F. Kempf, As-

sociate General Counsel, Intellectual Property, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration); id. at 13 (testimony of AlanJ. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S.
Department of State); id. at 16-17 (testimony of James E. Denny, Acting Assistant
Commissioner for Patents, U.S. Department of Commerce).
128 See H.R. REP. No. 788, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1. (1988).
129 Pub. L. 101-580, 104 Stat. 2863 (1990) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 105 (West
Supp. 1991)) [hereinafter Patents in Space Act].
130 For an overly exhaustive history of the Patents in Space legislation, see Burk,
supra note 20, at 335-38.
131 See id. at 338-39.
132 Id. at 345-49.
133 Id.

134 Id.
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available intellectual property protection. Inventions and discoveries that are ineligible for patents are often protected through
another form of intellectual property: trade secrets. 35 The question of trade secret protection for outer space activity has yet to
be addressed by Congress, but the need for such protection is
clear.
a.

Actual v. trade secrecy

Much of the incentive for investment in outer space development stems from the possibility that microgravity experiments
will yield knowledge that may be applied to produce commercially valuable products. The new manufacturing techniques developed in outer space may be applied on Earth, or eventually in
orbital manufacturing facilities.1 36 One commentator has
pointed out that many valuable industrial processes are ineligible
for patent protection and so are protected under the law of trade
secrets; consequently, the availability of trade secret protection
for outer space activity may be more important than the availability of patent protection. 137
The necessity of trade secret protection for outer space activity becomes all the more striking when the impossibility of actual secrecy aboard the space station is considered. 3 a One
possible way for investors to reap the benefits of valuable, but
unpatentable, outer space discoveries would be to keep the discoveries a secret. For such a scheme to work, absolute secrecy
would be required; absolute secrecy, however, is most likely not
feasible in the cramped quarters of the space station. 139 Far
more likely is the prospect that all those working aboard the
space station, as well as their consultants and colleagues on
Earth, will be aware of any new data or techniques arising from
research aboard the station.
A possible alternative to actual secrecy might be some private agreement. 40 Participants in outer space ventures might re135 See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1959); Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
14 U.L.A. 373 (supp. 1991).
136 See SPACE COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 81-83; COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE,
supra note 15, at 14; NationalSpace Council 1990 Report to the President, supra note 13,
at 23.
137 See Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Stations and the Law: Selected Issues - Background
Paper, 27JURIMETRICSJ. 431, 436 (1987) (book review).
138 Id.
139 Id.; Katherine Durant & Glen M.W. Trowbridge, Comment, Commerce and
Outer Space: A Legal Survey, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1551, 1556, 1571 (1986).
140 See Burk, supra note 20, at 350-51; see also DalBello, supra note 5 (suggesting
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sort to a contractual arrangement designed to preserve the
secrecy of valuable discoveries or processes; this approach is
used for mining platforms in international waters. 4 ' A contractual solution is of limited value, however, because it will only
cover the situations that the parties anticipate. 4 ' In addition, a
contractual solution cannot bind those who are not parties to it.
The Outer Space Treaty provides that nations shall have the
right to inspect space objects.' 4 3 Some commentators have suggested that this provision could prove troublesome for outer
space investors hoping to maintain confidentiality of their discoveries.144 Additionally, such inspectors might not be covered
under a private contractual arrangement.
Far preferable to actual secrecy or contractual agreements
would be the existence of a body of law that could cover unanticipated situations and that would protect investors who could not
maintain actual secrecy. Trade secrecy is a form of legal protection that only requires the inventor to take reasonable steps to
maintain confidentiality; if that confidentiality is breached, the
trade secret holder may have the right to damages.' 4 5 Trade secrecy also exists as a well-developed area of law able to cover
virtually any factual circumstance. Thus, the operation of trade
secret law may be critical to protect unpatentable but valuable
discoveries stemming from outer space research or similarly unpatentable manufacturing processes employed in outer space.
Trade secret law, however, is not federal law, but state
law.' 4 6 Ideally, Congress would take the necessary action to provide for trade secret protection aboard United States spacecraft.' 4 7 It has been suggested that this protection might be
achieved by enacting a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
as federal law, or by simply designating the trade secret law of
with regard to jurisdiction that "[p]re-launch agreements will probably be sufficient
while space station crews are very small").
141 See 1989 Hearing,supra note 22, at 79 (statement of Glenn H. Reynolds, Associate Professor, College of Law, University of Tennessee).
142 The transaction and search costs of the parties attempting to formulate a private solution may also be undesirable. See Burk,'supra note 20, at 351.
143 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 77, at art. XII.
144 See Durant & Trowbridge, supra 139, at 1556; Roger K. Hoover, Law and Security in Outer Space From the Viewpoint of Private Industry, 11 J. SPACE L. 115, 122-23
(1983).
145 See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1959); Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
14 U.L.A. 373 (supp. 1991).
146 See Reynolds, supra note 137.
147 Cf Cheng, supra note 103 (asserting that all states must take the necessary
steps to extend national laws for private claims to outer space).
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some state as controlling for outer space activity. 148 Unfortunately, considering Congress's procrastination in passing the relatively minor amendments needed to extend United States
patent law to outer space activity, the prospects for congressional
consideration of another form of intellectual property protection
seem dim.
b.

State jurisdiction

In the absence of any federal law addressing trade secrets in
space, participants in outer space ventures might attempt to protect their discoveries under state trade secret law. The interaction of state and federal laws in outer space has received little
attention, but legal mechanisms appear to exist for individual
states to assert jurisdiction over outer space activity.
Under the principles ofjurisdiction outlined by the Supreme
Court, states may assert jurisdiction over out-of-state entities if
those entities have had certain minimum contacts with the forum
state, which has statutorily authorized the exercise of such jurisdiction.' 4 9 In some instances, the defendant's presence in the forum state may be sufficient for jurisdiction to lie;' 50 in other
instances, a pattern of commercial or juridical conduct relating to
the forum will invoke jurisdiction. 15 1 In addition to the defendant's activities relating to the forum state, the availability of an
alternative forum and the inconvenience to the defendant of litigating far from his usual place of residence may also be considered in determining jurisdiction. 5 2 These principles may extend
state jurisdiction not only to United States citizens and corporations, but also to foreign nationals and corporations.' 5 3
Certain states, such as Texas, have statutorily authorized the
very broad exercise of their courts' extraterritorial jurisdiction.' 5 4
Commentators on the developing law of outer space have suggested that the Texas "long arm" jurisdictional statute might
permit Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction over persons committing acts in outer space, based upon such person's contact
148

See Reynolds, supra note 137.

149 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
150 See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
151 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
152 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
153 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
154 See, e.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-17.069 (West 1992)
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with "mission control" at the Johnson Space Center in Houston.' 55 Presumably, Florida or California would have even better
claims to assert jurisdiction over persons or entities regularly using NASA launch facilities at Cape Canaveral or landing facilities
at Edwards Air Force Base.' 5 6 Numerous other states might have
the requisite "minimum contacts" with foreign corporations involved in outer space research or manufacturing that also did
business within the given state. Finally, it is very likely that under
the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction, federal courts empowered
to hear patent infringement cases arising in outer space could
1 57
also hear related trade secret claims.
Once a court concluded that it in fact had authority to hear a
trade secret claim arising from outer space activity, a determination would be required as to which jurisdiction's substantive law
should be applied. Some recent commentators have considered
the problem of such choice of law decisions for outer space activity, but these analyses have assumed that a choice of law could be
58
made between nations.
Where the United States is concerned, however, no federal
or monolithic body of trade secret law exists. Thus, choice of law
determination would be greatly complicated by the need to
choose between the trade secret laws of fifty peculiar jurisdictions. The reasoning used to make such a choice of law would
closely track the approach that has been outlined for international choice of law and would conceptually resemble the reasoning applied to determine personal jurisdiction under the United
States' federal scheme. Under the analysis set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the court determines
what jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with the parties, considering the interests of the relevant jurisdictions in the
outcome of the case. 15 9 The law of that jurisdiction is then
applied.
Consequently, in an outer space trade secret dispute, it is
quite conceivable that jurisdiction could be exercised by a state
court that would decide to apply the substantive law of the forum
or another of the fifty states to resolve the case. Indeed, this reaSee OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 74.
156 See id. at 74-75 (suggesting that space station crew members, returning from
space through the United States via the Space Shuttle, would be subject to service
of process).
157 See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
158 See Shin, supra note 93.
159 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 6, 145 (1971).
155
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soning could well be applied to areas of law besides that of trade
secrets, thus further complicating the already bewildering jurisdictional patchwork of the multinational station Freedom. At least
in the area of trade secret law, however, the forum for a trade
secret dispute would need to answer yet another question in addition to those of personal jurisdiction and choice of law. Congress has enacted a statute dealing with intellectual property
protection in outer space, and before any state intellectual property protection may be applied, the question of federal preemption must be resolved.
II.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF TRADE SECRETS

The applicability of state law to outer space activity will be
defined not only by the constitutional constraints on state jurisdiction discussed above, but also by the constitutional constraints
on the operation of substantive state law in the federal union.
These constraints are defined in a body of United States
Supreme Court cases that attempts to define both the general
interaction of federal and state law and the implication of such
interaction for intellectual property law. Such an analysis must
begin, however, with some discussion of the purposes and effects
of each form of intellectual property protection; once the role of
each is understood, their interaction may be viewed through the
lens of constitutional preemption analysis.
A.

Patents and Trade Secrets

Although intellectual property protection was at one time regarded primarily as an equitable means to guard inventors' rights
inherent in their creations, it is today almost universally viewed
as a utilitarian legal construct for the protection of ideal or intellectual goods. 160 Knowledge or ideas associated with technological advances may be created as pure intellectual goods or
embodied to some degree in a physical form, such as an invention. 16 1 Like physical goods, intellectual goods may have great
industrial value, and generating such knowledge may entail significant production costs of time and effort. 162 Unlike physical
160 See ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 16 (1987).

161 See Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in
Marketsfor Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 209, 217-19 (1985); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-PosnerianLaw
and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 274-77 (1989).
162 BENKO,

supra note 160, at 17.
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goods, however, intellectual goods often do not encompass natural physical barriers that exclude potential consumers. 163 Ideas,
after all, may be held by more than one person at a time." 4 In
addition, the distribution costs for disseminating an intellectual
good such as an idea are minimal or nonexistent. 165 Once such
intellectual goods are disclosed, there are no real barriers to free
1 66
appropriation of the good.
In this way, intellectual goods appear to resemble public
goods, such as national defense, that also may be held by more
than one person at a time. 167 Because it is difficult to exclude
persons from deriving the benefit of the good, a significant
number of persons may consume the good without recompensing the good's originator. 6 8 This lack of recompense may create
a disincentive to create the good and the market for the good
may be undersupplied.' 69 The potential for an undersupply of
intellectual goods is not precisely the same problem as the potential undersupply of public goods: the potential for "free riding"
is likely much greater for intellectual goods. In the case of intellectual goods, unlike that of public goods, a consumer benefits
only from the first unit consumed, and not from any additional
units. 7 Furthermore, although public goods can usually be obtained only from the initial source, each consumer of intellectual
goods becomes a potential secondary source of supply. 17' These
additional complications in intellectual good supply amplify the
difficulty of identifying potential consumers and estimating the
good's value. Consequently, legal barriers have been developed
to accomplish what physical barriers are unavailable to do: allow
the intellectual good supplier to recapture his investment by excluding "free riders."
1. Patents: the federal scheme
The federal patent system comprises the most prominent set
of legal barriers designed to correct potential undersupply in the
163 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of PublicExpenditure, 36 REV. OF ECON. &
STATISTICS

387, 389 (1954) (discussing collective consumption goods).

164 See id.; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1965) (discuss-

ing collective goods).
165 See BENKO, supra note 160, at 17.
166 Id.
167 Id.; Palmer, supra note 161, at 274-75.
168 See BENKO, supra note 160, at 17.
169 Id.
170 See Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 161, at 218-19.
171 Id.
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market for technologically valuable intellectual goods. Article I,
Section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress authority to "promote the progress of science and useful
arts" by securing to inventors for a limited time the rights to
their work. 1 72 Congress has chosen to exercise this power by implementing a system of patents that grants a seventeen year exclusive right to use a new process,
machine, article of
73
matter.
of
composition
or
manufacture
Because patents grant the patent holder an exclusionary
right to the patented
invention, patents have been loosely termed
"monopolies."' 174 Patent lawyers have long protested this label,
noting that patents do not meet the criteria of a legal monopoly.
The patent only allows the holder to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention, and does not confer on the
holder an affirmative right to make, use or sell. 175 In addition,
there is some evidence that patents also do not entirely meet the
definition of an economic monopoly. 176 Unlike the true monopolist, patent holders may well face a marketplace containing a variety of substitutes for their products, and be forced to price their
products competitively. 177 Additionally, failure to price a patentderived product competitively may deprive the patent holder 17of
information necessary to identify the market's boundaries.
Although this information may be irrelevant to the true monopolist, its lack may prevent the patent holder from dominating the
market when the patent expires, allowing other firms to quickly
enter and erode the patent holder's preeminence. ' 71 "Patent,"
therefore, would not seem to be synonymous with either definition of monopoly.
Nonetheless, some patents probably do confer a virtual monopoly on their holders, and all patents represent some restraint
on trade.' 80 Consequently, patents are likely to generate the type
of inefficiencies associated with monopolies: higher prices, re172 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
173 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 154, 271(a) (1988).
174 See Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. IN LAW &
ECON. 31, 33 (1986).
175 See 1 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:6
at 45 (3d ed. 1984).
176 See Kitch, supra note 174.
177 Id. at 32, 33.
178 Id. at 38-39.
179 Id.

180 Id. at 33;

BENKO,

supra note 160, at 19.
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stricted supplies and inefficient allocation of resources.' ls Patents are, in fact, specifically designed to create such inefficiencies;
otherwise, the good might not be produced at all. The societal
costs generated by the patent system, however, must not be allowed to exceed the benefits of the intellectual goods it fosters.
This balance of costs and benefits is struck in large measure by
severely restricting the availability of patents. Patents are only
available to inventions that meet narrowly defined standards of
novelty, usefulness and non-obviousness.' 8 2 Before a patent issues, the application must pass through an extensive administrative review designed to ensure that the invention in question
meets these standards. 18 3 To qualify for the patent, the inventor
must disclose in detail how the invention is made and used; then,
this inforat the end of the seventeen year period of exclusivity,
18 4
mation passes into the public domain for all to use.
In addition to protecting the actual invention, the patent
also creates a zone of de facto protection against close substitutes. First, slight variations on the patented product will be unprotectable by patent because they will fail to meet the novelty
and non-obviousness requirements. Second, courts have recognized that inventions using close substitutes for elements of a
patent invention will infringe the patented claim if the substitute
performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way.' 8 5 These characteristics of the patent, when coupled
with the attribute of exclusivity, give patent protection an extremely broad scope. Such broad protection may be appropriate
where total control of an intellectual good is required as an incentive.' 8 6 Consequently, it is arguable that patent protection is
the appropriate vehicle for encouraging new technology because
generating such inventions requires a substantial investment that
may only be recovered by exclusive control of the invention
produced.'8 7
Although this brief sketch of patent economics suggests the
manner in which patenting is supposed to function, there is little
hard evidence as to whether patenting in fact works this way, or
Id.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (1988).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
184 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 154, 271(a) (1988).
185 See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.04 (1992) (discussing the Doctrine of
Equivalents).
186 BENKO, supra note 160, at 22.
187 Id.
181

182
183

588

SETON HALL LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:560

whether it works at all. Several competing theories have been
8
suggested to account for the beneficial effects of patenting.
The first theory suggests that patents encourage inventors to engage in inventive activity because of the potential rewards to be
reaped from exclusive control of the result.' 8 9 An alternative
theory that "has been more popular with the courts than with
[economist] commentators" 1 °0 holds that patents are socially
useful because they encourage disclosure of inventions that
might otherwise have been kept secret.19 ' Yet another set of theories suggests that, rather than facilitating invention or disclosure of inventions, patents offer an incentive for firms to make
the investment in innovation, i.e., in developing an existing invention for practical purposes. 1 9 2 All of these explanations are
open to question, and at least some economists have asserted
that none of them are correct; rather, they say, patents actually
generate more societal costs than benefits. 19 3 What does seem
apparent, though, is that business investors perceive patents to
be an important incentive to supporting new product research
and development and often will not invest in high risk venturessuch as commercial outer space activity-unless the assurance of
patent protection is available. 194
188 See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive

Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-44 (1989) (reviewing
major theories of patent rights).
189 See John S. McGee, Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9J. L.
& EcoN. 135 (1966); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE LJ. 267, 268-70 (1966).
190 See Eisenberg, supra note 188, at 1028.
191 See, e.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co., Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 331
(1945); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471 (1944).
192 "An invention refers to the practical implementation of the inventor's idea....
An innovation is the 'debugged' and functional version of the invention: the version
first offered for sale." Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 807 (1988). At least two major
variants on this theory have been proposed. See id. at 838- 46; Eisenberg, supra note
188, at 1036-44. The first suggests that monopoly conditions, such as those attending a patent right, are most conducive to commercial development of new inventions. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (3d
ed. 1950); see also Vernon W. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation,
and Technological Change, 73 QJ. ECON. 596 (1959); Carolyn Shaw Solo, Innovation in
the CapitalistProcess: A Critique of Schumpeterian Theory, 65 QJ. ECON. 417 (1951). The
second theory of innovation holds that patent rights mimic property rights, and so
internalize the external costs associated with communal ownership. See Edmund W.
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1977); cf.
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
193 See BENKO, supra note 160, at 19.
194 "[U]ncertainty over these [patent] issues is already having some impact on the
willingness of investors to become involved in space manufacturing and related
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Trade secrets: the state scheme

An alternative to intellectual property protection through
patenting is protection through trade secrecy. Ideal goods that
will not meet the patent requirements of novelty, non-obviousness and/or utility may be protected under state law as trade
secrets.' 95 Like patents, trade secrecy was initially perceived not
as an economic incentive to invention, but as an equitable legal
mechanism;1 9 6 unlike patents, trade secret has remained close to
its roots and is still conceived of as a regulation to promote ethical business practices. 9 7 Thus, causes of action for trade secret
misappropriation arise from an assemblage of doctrines gathered
98
from tort, contract, property and unfair competition law.'
Nonetheless, trade secrecy involves clear economic characteristics flowing from the rights that are recognized. A trade secret is a legal interest in business information or technical knowhow, which may include anything besides tangible capital and labor necessary to start up a business. 99 As with other rights in
ideal goods, a trade secret interest entitles the holder to possession and use of the protected information. 20 0 Trade secret interest, however, is limited to protecting one's right to the fruit of
one's labor obtained by nefarious or unfair means. 20 ' The trade
secret interest does not prevent competitors from obtaining the
secret through legitimate means such as reverse engineering, ac2 °2
cidental disclosure or independent development.
Generally, to qualify for trade secret protection, an intellectual good must be used in the owner's business and must confer
some economic or competitive advantage upon the owner beventures. Even if [outer space patent legislation] did nothing more than soothe
fears of the business community and help to encourage investment in such ventures, it would be well worth the time and effort." 1989 Hearing, supra note 22, at
25 (statement of Glenn H. Reynolds, Associate Professor, College of Law, University of Tennessee).
195

See

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757, cmt. b (1959).

See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
197 See Elizabeth Miller, Note, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Secret Licensing: A Legal
Review and Economic Analysis, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 186 (1989).
198 See Richard H. Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law After
Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 927, 937-38 (1974) (reviewing common law bases
of trade secret law).
199 David R. MacDonald, Know-How Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 62 MICH. L.
REV. 351, 355 (1964).
200 See Miller, supra note 197, at 184.
201 Id. at 185.
202 Id. at 185-86; MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAw § 11.01 at 11-2 (1988).
196
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cause it is not generally known.20 3 The latter requirement implies that the property right in the secret exists only so long as it
remains a secret. This does not mean that absolute secrecy must
be maintained, but the owner must take reasonable steps to
20 4
shield the intellectual good from common use and knowledge.
In addition, the definition of a trade secret implies some minimum degree of novelty or originality, because information that is
generally known in the trade cannot qualify as a secret.20 5
a.

Protected subject matter

Trade secrecy's criterion of reasonable secrecy defines a particular boundary on the pool of inventions that may be protected
in this manner. As a practical matter, this pool is likely to be
distinct from that pool of inventions for which patents are
sought. A portion of the trade secret invention pool will be comprised of inventions that are not patentable subject matter; these
inventions may only be protected by trade secrecy. 206 Ptnal
Patentable
inventions that are never patented will constitute another portion
of the trade secret invention pool. For those inventions that are
patentable subject matter, concurrent patent and trade secret
protection is incompatible because the disclosure required by the
patent destroys trade secrecy.2 °7 Patents will only be sought for
items whose disclosure was inevitable, however, and the patent
bargain will not prompt the disclosure of intellectual goods that
can be kept secret indefinitely. 20 8 The Coca-Cola soft drink
203

See

§ 757 cmt. b (1959); 1 ROGER M.
§§ 2.02, 2.03 (1992).

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

GRIM ON TRADE SECRETS
204 See id.
205 See supra note 203.
206 Limited exceptions

MILGRIM, MIL-

to this rule exist under specific provision of other federal
intellectual property laws. For example, some unpatentable software inventions
may be protected under federal copyright provisions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102,
117 (1988). Certain unpatentable pharmaceutical inventions may be protected
under the Orphan Drug Act. Pub. L. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 15, 21, 43 and 45). In addition, protection for
mask works falls under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 901-14 (1988).
207 See MILGRIM, supra note 203, at §§ 2.06, 8.02[2].
208 See FRITZ MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 281 (1952). Note
that this assertion differs from the that of the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v.

Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), where Chief Justice Burger claimed that an
inventor whose discovery was eligible for patent protection was unlikely to rely on
trade secret protection. Id. at 490. This statement was based on the assumption
that a patent would be more attractive because its protection is absolute, whereas
trade secrecy may be annulled by reverse engineering or independent invention.
Id. The relevant criterion is not the breadth of protection, however, but the max-
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formula provides the classic example of such a situation: as a
trade secret, it has remained proprietary for decades and not
merely exclusive for seventeen years, the period of protection
available when a formula has been disclosed in a patent.2 0 9
The trade secret invention pool will not, however, include
patentable subject matter whose disclosure is inevitable. Trade
secret protection is almost impossible to maintain for product inventions that, once on the market, may be acquired, examined,
and duplicated, or reverse engineered.2 "0 Process inventions
that are not themselves placed into the stream of commerce,
however, may lend themselves to trade secret protection. This
criterion of exclusion marks the dividing line between those inventions that will be patented and those that will be protected by
trade secret. Trade secrets may be maintained as trade secrets
only because they can be feasibly screened from public view. 2 '
Consequently, trade secrets are by definition private goods
rather than public goods: were they public goods, trade secrets
would have to be patented or pass into the public domain.2 12
b.

Licensing and profits

The economics of trade secrecy also sharply differ from that
of patenting in the return that a trade secret holder may receive
for her invention. A patent is by definition a legal restraint on
trade, and, through licensing, the patent holder may grant the
right to practice the disclosed invention. 213 A trade secret, by
contrast, is not a restraint on trade, and the trade secret licensor
lacks the ability to impose such a restraint.2 14 Unlike the patent
holder, a trade secret licensor possesses no right to exclude, enjoying only limited protection against competitors who appropriate her intellectual property through a circumscribed class of
imization of profits. The rational inventor will choose whichever form of protection
will give him the greatest return on his investment. If an inventor believes that his
discovery may be screened from the public indefinitely, he may well opt for perpetual income under trade secrecy rather than seventeen years' income under a patent.
See Stern, supra note 198, at 946-47; K. David Crockett, The Salvaged Dissents of Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 27, 63 (1990).
209 See Palmer, supra note 161, at 293.
210 See Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 977, 982 (1977).
211 Michael I. Krauss, Property, Monopoly, and Intellectual Rights, 12 HAMLINE L. REV.
305, 312 (1989); see also Palmer, supra note 161, at 293.
212 See Krauss, supra note 211.
213 JAGER, supra note 202, § 11.01 at 11-3.
214 Id.; MILGRIM, supra note 203, § 6.05[2] at 6-274.
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illegitimate actions.2 1 5 Stated another way, trade secret rights,
unlike patent rights, cannot be used as an offensive weapon
against those who independently develop the intellectual
good.2 1 6 Whereas the patent holder can bargain for an exclusive
right against the world, the trade secret licensor can bargain only
for disclosure of the secret.21 7 Consequently, the trade secret
holder cannot offer a licensee any protection against third parties
who may independently develop or reverse engineer the proffered non-tangible goods.2 1 8
In addition, because the trade secret holder has only disclosure to offer, the position she must take in exploiting her ideal
good poses something of a paradox. The trade secret licensor
bargains for disclosure, yet the potential licensee cannot assess
the value of the secret until it is disclosed. 219 The secret may
perhaps be disclosed under some obligation of confidence, but
this mechanism imposes an additional cost on the potential licensee who accepts the constraint before he is able to evaluate the
secret. 22 0 The cumbersome security measures that therefore surround any trade secret sales or licensing transaction entail costs
that may significantly affect the price that the trade secret holder
can demand for her invention.2 2 1
Transactional costs aside, the trade secret holder is severely
constrained in the price that she may demand for disclosure.
This constraint is inherent in the nature of the trade secret right,
22 2
which does not preclude re-invention or reverse engineering.
Should the trade secret licensor set her price too high, the potential licensee may choose to independently develop the proffered
item or expertise. 2 2 ' To avoid this outcome, the trade secret inventor may reduce her licensing fees to a level where the cost of
independent reinvention is greater than the cost of purchasing a
license. 2 24 This approach reduces the inventor's profit, effectively redistributing it to share the wealth of the new technol215 Id.

216 See Miller, supra note 197, at 185.
217 Id.; MILGRIM, supra note 203, § 6.05[2] at 6-274; JAGER, supra note 202,

§ 11.01 at 11-3.
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Miller, supra note 197, at 185; MILGRIM, supra note 203, § 6.05[2] at 6-274.
See Kitch, supra note 192, at 278; Eisenberg, supra note 188, at 1029-30
See Kitch, supra note 192, at 278.
See id. at 279; Adelman, supra note 210, at 982.
Adelman, supra note 210, at 981.
MILGRIM, supra note 203, § 6.05[2] at 6-276.
Adelman, supra note 210, at 981.
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ogy. 225 Thus, trade secret protection entails a form of selfregulation that prevents the development of a substantial disparity between the cost of creating new technology and the value
that can be privately appropriated from that technology. 22 6 Such
self-regulation seems appropriate for a class of inventions that
need not be novel, useful and non-obvious, already entail natural
barriers to exclude free-riders, and are eligible for perpetual
protection.
By contrast, neither of the price constraints discussed above
appears in the patent system. The secrecy costs surrounding
trade secret licensing are not found in similar patent transactions
where the invention has already been disclosed.2 2 7 It has been
suggested that the true value of the patent system lies in allowing
two parties to approach licensing negotiations with relative parity
of information.2 28 In addition, the patent system contains no intrinsic control on the rate of return, such as that found in trade
secrecy. 22 9 The practical check created by the threat of reinvention is eliminated in the patent system by the statutory trade-off
of disclosure for an absolute right of exclusion. 2 30 The prospect
of patent "super profits" for a limited period may be justified to
prompt creation or development in a limited class of significant
or capital-intensive inventions.
B.

FederalPreemption Analysis

The coexistence of two systems of intellectual property protection raises the prospect that they may come into conflict. In a
federal system like that of the United States, such questions regarding the interaction of national and state power have often
arisen. Professor Laurence Tribe suggests that such cases come
in three flavors. 23 1 In the first, preemption of state legislation in
an area delegated to Congress may raise "complex questions of
statutory construction but raise no controversial issues of
225
226

Id.
Id. at 981-82.

227 See Kitch, supra note 192, at 278; Adelman, supra note 210, at 982.
228 See Kitch, supra note 192, at 278; Eisenberg, supra note 188, at 1029-30.
229 See Adelman, supra note 210, at 984. Instead, the patent system introduces as

control mechanisms an administrative review of novelty, utility and nonobviousness
prior to issuing the patent and antitrust scrutiny after issuing the patent. Id. at 984,
986.
230 Id. at 984.
231 See LAURENCE H.
ed. 1988).

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAw §

6-25, at 479 (2d
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power. "232 In the second, issues of power may arise in instances
where the action of a state intrudes upon a latent or constitutionally "dormant" power of the federal government.233 In the
third, issues of state and federal powers may be raised in "hybrid" cases involving not an exclusive federal power, but a pervasive scheme of federal regulation that "occupies" a given area of
concern. 234 The reasoning in each of these types of cases directly
impacts the analysis of whether state trade secret law may legitimately operate in outer space.
1. The commerce cases
Much of the character of the relationship between the United
States' state and national governments has been defined by
Supreme Court interpretation of the constitutional commerce
power granted to Congress. Creation of a centralized authority
to regulate commerce was in large part the justification for drafting a new federal constitution, aimed at curbing the parochial
economic interests unrestrained under the former Articles of
Confederation. 2 35 The power was not fashioned as an exclusive

federal power; thus, control of commerce is ostensibly a concurrent prerogative of the state and federal governments. In order
to achieve the purposes of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the provision entails both an affirmative federal power to regulate commerce and a negative limitation on the states' ability to pursue their own commercial
agendas.
This balance between state and national interests in implementing the commerce power is inherent in the text of the seminal commerce case, Gibbons v. Ogden. 2 36 In Gibbons, a federally
licensed steamboat operator challenged New York's stategranted monopoly on steamboat traffic. 237 The opinion by Chief
Justice John Marshall recognized both the state's traditional "police power" to govern the health and safety of its citizens and the
federal authority to regulate commerce as "intercourse" among
the states.2
232
233
234
235
236
237
238

Id.
Id.
Id.
See
22
Id.
Id.

38

This affirmative federal power has since been rec-

id. § 6-3, at 404.
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
at 6.
at 189, 208.
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ognized to extend not only to traffic among
the states, 23 9 but to
240
traffic.
such
impact
any matter that might

Later cases also recognized certain negative implications of
the commerce power, holding that "[w]hatever subjects of this
power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress." 24 '
Where the courts find such a national interest, the need for such
exclusive federal regulation abrogates any state enactment. At
the same time, the Supreme Court has "recognized that there are
matters of local concern ...

which, because of their local charac-

ter and their number and diversity, may never be fully dealt with
by Congress. 24 2 In general, matters recognized to be of legitimate local concern are those involving state overview of health
and safety.243 Even an exercise of a state's police powers in such
an area, however, cannot be permitted to create an economic
barrier to interstate commerce.244
Delineation of local from national matters, and determination of whether state treatment of local matters impermissibly encumbers interstate commerce, has been an ongoing saga in
constitutional jurisprudence. After struggling with different
standards for measuring the compatibility of state laws with national interests, the Court eventually settled on a formulation
that assays the state law at issue for evenhanded regulation that
does not discriminate between local and out-of-state interests. 245
This standard inquires whether the law's impact on interstate
commerce is "incidental" to its purpose, whether the local purpose is legitimate and whether alternate means are available to
achieve the purpose.2

46

This mode of analysis has had an impact

on delineation of state and federal superintendence not only as a
matter of constitutional power, but also as a matter of legislative
supremacy.247
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 565 (1870).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319
(1851).
242 South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177,
185 (1938).
243 See id.; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
244 See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951).
245 See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938).
246 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
247 See infra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
239
240
241
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This formulation has also been the basis for analyzing questions of both domestic commerce regulation and foreign commerce. Analysis of foreign commerce questions, however, differs
sharply in the weight accorded national interests. In Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 248 the Supreme Court determined
that a challenged California property tax satisfied the dormant
commerce test for evenhanded, legitimate local regulation.249
But, where the tax was applied to containers owned by Japanese
shipping companies, the tax was held to burden unduly commerce with foreign nations. 250 According to the Court, unilateral
taxation of oceangoing trade by a particular state could invite international disputes and trade retaliation impacting the entire nation.25 ' Thus, the "negative implications" of Congress's power
to regulate foreign commerce required more stringent treatment
of state law than the "negative implications" of the domestic
commerce power.252
2.

The supremacy cases

The opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden marked the beginning of a
body of jurisprudence dealing with the exclusionary effect of the
Commerce Clause as well as with the similar effects of the
Supremacy Clause.253 According to Gibbons, state statutes,
"though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted,
must yield" to federal enactments because of the Supremacy
Clause. 2 54 Although subsequent cases dealing with Supremacy

Clause preemption purportedly confined their analyses to statutory interpretation, they are closely linked to the dormant commerce cases. Drawing on the legacy of Gibbons, the supremacy
cases often employ much the same reasoning as that used in the
dormant commerce cases, particularly where congressional silence, or the negative implications of federal statutes, is concerned.2 55 In each instance, the Court is attempting to define the
interaction of state and federal powers. The grounds for pre248
249
250
251

441 U.S. 434 (1979).
Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 450-51.
Id. at 449-50.

Id. at 446, 450.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of
the Land ....
).
254 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 211 (1824).
255 See Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REV. 208, 219 (1959) [hereinafter Stanford Note].
252
253
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emption stated in these cases fall along a continuum: at one end,
state statutes are declared clearly preempted; at the opposite
end, they are declared clearly not preempted; and in the center,
various mixtures of state and federal interests are balanced.2 56
These declarations, in turn, may reflect something of the relationship between state and federal law in a given instance, from
direct and unavoidable conflicts between state and federal law at
one end of the spectrum, to distinct and isolated operation of
state and federal law at the other end, with various degrees of
potential interference falling somewhere in the middle.257 The
determination of potential conflict requires a subjective evaluation of public policy, and, in fact, the Supreme Court has enormous freedom to construe the federal statutes at issue broadly or
narrowly in order to preserve some state statutes and eliminate
others. 28
a.

Express preemption

In determining whether state regulation is displaced by federal regulation, the Court's inquiry has ostensibly focused on determining congressional intent: the legislature's actual will
regarding the preemptive effect of a given federal statute. Thus,
the Court has stated that when Congress offers some express
statutory statement as to federal preemption, "the courts' task is
an easy one. '"259 Considerable confusion has arisen, however,
because of the Court's ostensible focus on intent. 260 Even where
an explicit statement of preemption is included in the federal
statute, the problem of preemption is by no means settled. The
scope of preemption under an explicit statement can be determined only by determining the powers conferred by the statute,
and the powers conferred can be determined only by looking to
the policy underlying the statute.26 '
256 See Stern, supra note 198, at 930.
257 See Kenneth L. Hirsch, Toward A New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL.

L.F. 515, 519.
258 See id. at 534.
259 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
260 See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 209; Hirsch, supra note 257, at 534, 53738.
261 See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 211. Cf 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 15 (1978) (discussing the court's role in shaping antitrust
doctrines). Areeda and Turner have commented that:
[J]udges sometimes talk as if Congress has already decided the question before them. This is usually a misconception. It is harmless
when the judge would, in all events, have reached a sound conclusion.
But the attribution can be mischievous when it is a substitute for
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Thus, an explicit statement of preemptive intent served only
as a starting place for analysis in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.262
In Rice, the Court was asked to determine whether the acts of the
Illinois Commerce Commission regarding grain warehouses
were preempted by the United States Warehouse Act.263 The
Court noted that the Warehouse Act provided that the Secretary
of Agriculture had "exclusive" power, jurisdiction and authority
with respect to licensing under the Act. 26 4 The Court also noted,
however, that the exclusivity provision was not of itself determinative. The federal regulatory scheme left many areas of concern
unaddressed, and the state scheme could have been found to harmoniously supplement the federal Act. 265 By looking further into
the statute's legislative history and purposes, the Rice Court determined that Congress intended to place all the regulation in
the area under one agency in order to achieve uniformity.266 The
state scheme, therefore, had to give way.
The Rice decision illustrates the policy analysis that courts
must undertake even where a federal statute mandates preemption, but much the same problem exists where Congress includes
language expressly declining to preempt state statutes. 67 Just as
preemption language must be carefully analyzed to determine
the scope of the intended effect, so must "saving clauses" be examined to assess their scope. 26s A savings clause cannot be assumed to prevent federal preemption of any and all impinging
state laws. Congress cannot anticipate all the possible conflicts
between a particular federal statute and a statute of one of the
fifty states; indeed, the enactment of many potentially conflicting
state statutes may yet occur in the future when Congress includes
a savings clause in a newly minted federal statute.269 Consequently, the Court's task in the face of language expressly stating
thought and analysis. The judge who really thinks that Congress has
already decided the matter at issue is not likely to think very long or
hard about the conclusion, for which he erroneously supposes that he
is not responsible.
Id. at 15-16.
262 331 U.S. 218 (1947). See also Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 211 (discussing
Rice); Hirsch, supra note 257, at 532-33 (same).
263 Rice, 331 U.S. at 221-24.
264 Id. at 224.
265 Id. at 231-32.
266 Id. at 236.
267 See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 212.
268 Id. at 211-14; Hirsch, supra note 257, at 540.
269 See Hirsch, supra note 257, at 540, 543.
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congressional intent may be no easier than when Congress has
been silent.
b.

Field preemption

Where Congress has not seen fit to provide an explicit indication of intent, the Supreme Court looks to the nature of the
statutory scheme in an attempt to find evidence of congressional
intent. 2 70

Here again, framing the inquiry in terms of intent

tends to obscure the importance of the underlying policy inquiry,
preventing the development of guidelines that could inform future decisions. 27 ' As in the cases where an explicit statement of
intent purportedly makes the Court's task an easy one, the actual
focus of the inquiry still tends toward an assessment of compatibility between the state and federal statutes.272 This actual focus
becomes apparent when the Court's tests for implied intent are
carefully examined.
The Supreme Court will infer that Congress intended to preempt any operation of state law in a field that the Court finds
Congress has intended to occupy exclusively.273 The intent for
such "field preemption" may, for example, be inferred if Congress has enacted a pervasive scheme of federal regulation that
leaves no room for state regulation.274 The Court's assumption
under this test appears to be that a pervasive federal scheme suggests an intent to maintain exclusive federal control over the particular area.2 75 Thus, in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc. ,276 the pervasiveness of federal regulation over aviation was
deemed an indication of congressional intent to preempt the
field of aircraft noise regulation. A local ordinance limiting the
hours of aircraft take-off was accordingly declared preempted because "the pervasive control vested in [federal agencies] under
the [federal statute] seems to us to leave no room for local curfews or other local controls. 277 Commentators have suggested
that this test for preemption makes some practical sense: where
the federal scheme is less pervasive, elimination of state statutes
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
See Hirsch, supra note 257, at 537-38.
See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 208.
English, 496 U.S. at 79.
Id.; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
See TRIBE, supra note 231, § 6-27, at 497.
411 U.S. 624 (1973).
Id. at 638.
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might create an undesirable "legal vacuum. ' 27" This negative
form of the pervasiveness test, however, ignores the Court's will27 9
ingness to create such a vacuum when the mood strikes it.
Creation of a legal vacuum may give the Court pause, but other
considerations obviously enter into any decision to find
preemption.
Some of these considerations involve the states' traditional
place in the federal union. Field preemption, if invoked, eliminates all state regulation within the designated area, even if the
state regulation supports or furthers the federal interest.28 0 Perhaps because of this broad effect, the Court has in recent years
shown some reluctance to declare field preemption unless congressional intent to preempt is "clear and manifest." ' 28 ' This cri-

terion seems almost ludicrous in the midst of a legal exercise to
infer legislative intent; the exercise-would be unnecessary if the
intent were clear and manifest. This particular juridical buzzword,
however, appears to signal a sort of heightened scrutiny that the
Court will apply to the relationship between federal and state
powers, particularly where the field of federal regulation is one
"traditionally occupied by the States.

' 28 2

Indeed, these phrases

seem to be employed to communicate something of a presumption against preempting state law when the federal regulation ap28 3
pears to occupy a field "traditionally occupied by the States.
One consequence of such deference to state interests is that
it permits a glimpse into the mechanism behind a finding of preemption. This analytical step generally forces the Court to abandon its charade of determining congressional intent from a
particular statutory scheme. Instead, the Court looks to the subSee TRIBE, supra note 231, § 6-27, at 497.
For example, in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), the
Court recognized that its finding of preemption created a "no-man's land" of cases
that would escape both federal and state law. The Court excused this result, however, by maintaining that "Congress has expressed its judgment in favor of uniformity ... [that] judgment must be respected whatever policy objections there may
be to creation of a no-man's land." Id. at 10-11.
280 See Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q 69, 72 (1988).
281 SeeJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
282 Id.
283 See Elaine M. Martin, Note, The Burger Court and Preemption Doctrine:Federalism in
the Balance, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233, 1254 (1985) (noting de facto presumption in favor of preserving state legislation); William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 623, 628, 642 (1975) (same).
278

279
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ject matter of the affected area to determine whether the field is
one of traditional state interest. 28 4 This inquiry, ostensibly at the
level of statutory construction, closely resembles a federalism
analysis at the constitutional level under the Commerce Clause
analysis. 285 The Court here engages in the same weighing of interests as it would when examining state laws to determine
whether they favor local economic interests over the interstate
market. 286 This similarity is perhaps not surprising; the areas
most likely to have traditionally been occupied by the states are
those identified in the commerce cases as involving the states'
police powers.287
Thus, in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,2 88 the

Court let stand a California regulation aimed at protecting consumers from the marketing of immature avocados. 289 According
to the record cited by the Court, immature avocados are unpalatable, but visually indistinguishable from mature fruit.2 90 In an
opinion redolent of its commerce decisions, the Court placed the
regulation squarely within the state's traditional police powers. 2 '
Consequently, although the federal Secretary of Agriculture had
promulgated marketing orders that judged avocado maturity on
criteria different from those of the California regulation, the Florida Lime Court found no conflict. The Court observed that "[t]he
maturity of avocados seems to be an inherently unlikely candidate for exclusive federal regulation. Certainly it is not a subject
by its very nature admitting only of national supervision. Nor is
it a subject demanding exclusive federal regulation in order to
achieve uniformity vital to national interests.

'2 92

The Court

found that avocado standards are "a matter of peculiarly local
concern, ' 29 3 well within the states' legitimate interest in protecting their citizens from " 'fraud and deception in 2the
sale of food
products' at retail markets within their borders. 94
See TRIBE, supra note 231, § 6-27, at 499.
See id.; JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.3, at
313 (4th ed. 1991).
286 See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 220.
287 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 285; cf supra notes 238- 44 and accompanying text.
288 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
289 Id. at 137-38.
284
285

290

Id.

See id. at 144-45 (quoting Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148,
162 (1942)).
292 Id. at 143-44 (citations omitted).
293 Id. at 144.
294 Id. (quoting Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894)).
291
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If the Supreme Court appears likely to uphold state regulation in areas traditionally deemed local, then the inverse of this
principle also holds true: in an area traditionally deemed national, the Court may be more inclined to strike down state legislation.2 05 Congressional intent to preempt may be inferred
where the regulatory field is one in which federal interest is so
dominant that actions by the states are presumed excluded.2 9 6
Here again, the test for preemption cloaks more than a simple
question of statutory construction. As was the case in Gibbons,
many of the preemption cases involve issues that could be framed
either as supremacy or as commerce questions because the federal statute at issue was enacted under the commerce power.2 9 7
The Court has generally taken the approach of deciding these
cases on supremacy grounds even though the controversy might
otherwise have been resolved by an appeal to the commerce
power.2 98 The same is true where other constitutional powers
are implicated, particularly if these are powers reserved to the
federal government.2 9 9 This tendency has led some commentators to suggest that preemption analysis at the statutory level may
in fact implement constitutional principles external to the
Supremacy Clause.3 ° °
For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz,"0 ' the Court invalidated
a state statute requiring the registration of aliens. Hidden behind the preemption analysis in Hines was a principle of strong
deference to Congress's constitutional powers to prescribe a uni3 °2
form rule of naturalization and to conduct foreign relations.
Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 3 a state statute criminalizing
Communist activity was held preempted by federal sedition statutes; again, the Court appeared to focus not on the federal statute's text, but on the national and perhaps international
ramifications of Communist activity. 30 4 The Court's practice of
See TRIBE, supra note 231, § 6-27, at 500.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
See TRIBE, supra note 231, § 6-29, at 508-11; Stanford Note, supra note 255, at
219-21.
298 See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 219.
299 Id. at 218-19.
300 See id. at 218.
295
296
297

301
302

312 U.S. 52, 73-74 (1941).

See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 218, Cf Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1
(1982) (University of Maryland policy against admitting aliens preempted because
of broad federal authority to establish rules of naturalization and regulate foreign
affairs).
303 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
304 See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 218-19.
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deciding such constitutionally loaded cases by announcing an ostensibly statutory decision may implicitly parallel the Court's explicit practice of avoiding a decision on constitutional grounds
where possible. 3 0 5 The latter practice has been said to lend flexibility and vitality to the constitutional analysis that the Court
must reach and to avoid unnecessary constitutional rule making
that might undermine the Court's prestige.3 0 6 In addition, a
preference for analysis at the statutory level facilitates congressional review and revision of the Court's holding; such revision
would be far more difficult were the Court to enshrine its analysis
at a constitutional level. 307 Similar benefits may flow from basing preemption analysis on statutory interpretation, rather than
indulging in commerce-type scrutiny every time a constitutional
power is implicated. 0 8
c.

Weighing state interests

Given that the Supreme Court likely weighs competing factors in field preemption in much the same way that it weighs factors under the dormant Commerce Clause, the necessity that the
Court go through the motions of statutory interpretation still
makes the outcome of any particular evaluation difficult to predict. Even with a presumption in favor of upholding the state
regulation, field preemption analysis requires the Court to engage in an exceptionally subjective articulation of legislative intent.30 9
One commentator has nicely summed up the
"definitional difficulties" posed by this determination when undertaken within the framework of field preemption: First, what is
the field, and second, what determines whether the field is occupied? 310 In practice these questions likely collapse into one another. Depending on how the Court gerrymanders the
boundaries of the field, it may or may not be too crowded for
state regulation to operate.
See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 441 (1821).
See PAUL A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 58-59 (1951);
FELIX FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS 24-26 (1939).
307 See TRIBE, supra note 231, § 6-2, at 403-04.
308 See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 224-25.
309 See Wolfson, supra note 280, at 73-74.
310 Id. at 72. See also Bratton, supra note 283, at 627 n.29 ("The field's extent
frequently is the point of contention, but precise bounds usually must be derived by
inference from purpose interpretation."). Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 7879 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("Every Act of Congress occupies some field, but
we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded a
state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution.").
305
306
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Although the Court has offered no candid explanation as to
the manner in which it charts the contours of a preemptive field,
certain decisions allow some insight into the process. The field
charting process is perhaps best observed in a trilogy of cases
beginning with Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Development Commission,3 11 where it was alleged that
a set of California utility laws was preempted by federal regulations overseeing nuclear power generation. The California laws
prevented the construction of nuclear power facilities until methods were assured for the storage and disposal of spent radioactive fuel; this regulatory scheme, it was claimed, intruded upon
Congress's occupation of the field in the Atomic Energy Act.3 12
The Court looked to the legislative history of the Atomic Energy
Act to draw the boundaries of the preempted field, holding that
although Congress had preempted the field of nuclear safety,
other matters of utility regulation, which were the traditional
purview of the states, were not preempted.3 1 3 The Pacific Gas
Court then held that the challenged California statutes did not
fall within the preempted field of nuclear safety, but rather constituted traditional state regulation concerning the economics of
nuclear power generation. 314 The Court concluded that "the
statute lies outside the federally occupied field of nuclear safety
3 15
regulation.
This demarcation of the nuclear safety field was revisited in
two subsequent cases, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 316 and English
v. GeneralElectric Co. 3 17 Both of these cases concerned tort claims,
rather than legislative enactments, and both witnessed the Court
defining the contours of the federal field so as to exclude a traditional state concern. Silkwood involved a tort suit against a nuclear power plant operator for negligently exposing an employee
to radioactive contamination.3 1 8 English involved a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress by a nuclear plant employee
who had been dismissed from her job for reporting safety violations. 31 9 The defendants in both cases claimed that Pacific Gas, in
mapping out a field of nuclear safety upon which states could not
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318

461 U.S. 190, 207-08 (1983).
Id. at 197-99, 204.
Id. at 206-12.
Id. at 213-24.

Id. at 191.

464 U.S. 238 (1984).
496 U.S. 72 (1990).
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 243.
319 English, 496 U.S. at 77.
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intrude, preempted any tort awards.3 2 °
In Silkwood, the award of punitive damages was specifically
challenged because exemplary damages are designed to deter
unsafe practices, and nuclear safety supposedly constituted a
field completely occupied by federal safety regulations. 32 ' The

Court rejected this contention, tracing the boundaries of the field
in such a way that "the pre-empted field does not extend as far as
[the defendant] would have it."' 322 As in Pacific Gas, the Court

looked to the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act and
found no indication that Congress intended to preclude the
states from providing remedies for tortious injury.323 The
Silkwood Court also looked to a separate enactment that set a limit
on state suits arising out of a nuclear accident as evidence that
Congress had expected state tort law to continue to apply in this
area. Thus, because "[p]unitive damages have long been a part
of traditional state tort law ' 324 and because no clear congressional intent to preempt could be found, the Court rejected the
appellant's claim. Similar reasoning was employed in English to
find that the suit was not preempted because such remedies have
"traditionally .

.

. been available to those persons who .

.

. allege

' 32 5

outrageous conduct at the hands of an employer,
and the
Atomic Energy Act showed no "clear and manifest" intent by
26
3
Congress to preempt.

The pattern that emerges from these cases is a redrawing of
the federal field so as to avoid obliterating well established areas
of state superintendence, while preserving some semblance of
federal supremacy. The Pacific Gas line of cases typify what has
been called "the extreme reluctance of the modern Court to find
preemption.

' 3 27

Whereas the courts at one time effaced state

statutes with some abandon, the presumption in favor of preserving state enactments has, in recent years, been adhered to with
some vigor.328 Because field preemption sweeps so broadly,
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 245, 249; English, 496 U.S. at 77-78.
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 245-46.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 255.
English, 496 U.S. at 83.
326 Id.
327 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CONST.
COMM. 311, 317 (1988).
328 Id. at 312. See generally Martin, supra note 283 (tracing the shift away from
federal centralization); Bratton, supra note 283 (same). But see Michael Maher, Federal Preemption: New Barrierto Injured Victims, TRIAL 61 (Nov. 1991) (observing that
320

321
322
323
324
325
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however, the boundaries of the field must be drawn with some
care, and sometimes redrawn, in order to preserve state regulation. The same goal may be better achieved by instead relying on
a more precise preemptive tool: conflict analysis.
d. Actual conflict
Where the courts find no intent to preempt an entire field of
action, state law will still be declared preempted to the extent
that it is found to actually conflict with federal law. Such "conflict preemption" may be found where compliance with both regulatory schemes is physically impossible or where the state law
"stands as3 29
an obstacle" to the federal statute's purposes and
objectives.
The sweep
of conflict preemption is potentially

less comprehensive than that of field preemption. Whereas a
declaration of field preemption invalidates all state laws within a
given area, including even those that advance federal objectives,
conflict preemption invalidates only those portions of state law
declared to conflict with federal objectives.330 Invoking conflict
preemption therefore allows the Court to trim away offending
state statutes without the elaborate exercise of shaping the borders of a preemptive field so as to avoid eliminating necessary
state operations.
In theory, conflict preemption involves a closer inquiry into
the purposes and operation of both the federal and state statutes
in question. In determining field preemption the Court turns
first to the federal statute to determine the field's contours, and
only then to the state statute to ascertain whether it falls within
those contours.33 ' Conflict preemption requires an examination
of the expected and likely results flowing from both the federal
and state
statutes in order to determine if those results will conflict. 33 2 Yet, in practice, the court engaging in conflict preemption will, as with field preemption, be required to look at the state
statute's purposes and policies to determine the potential for actual conflict with the narrow objectives underlying the federal
statute. 333 The state statute will then be invalidated if the statdespite the Court's reluctance to find preemption, such claims are multiplying in
state tort suits).
329 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
330 See Hirsch, supra note 257, at 529.
331 See id.
332

Id.

333

See

TRIBE,

supra note 231, § 6-26, at 482-83.
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ute's effect is to discourage
the result that the federal statute is
33 4
intended to encourage.
This similarity suggests that the line between these two approaches is less than distinct, and the Supreme Court has in fact
acknowledged that "[f]ield pre-emption may be understood as a
species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a preempted field conflicts with Congress's intent (either express or
plainly implied) to exclude state regulation. ' 335 Consequently, it
should not be surprising to find that conflict analysis involves a
familiar weighing of valid local interests against restrictive effects, and where local interests outweigh the restrictive effects,
the state statute may be upheld.3 3 6
The collapse of field preemption into conflict preemption is
nowhere more pronounced than in a subspecialty of conflict preemption involving the "delicate balance" test.3 3 7 The delicate
balance cases acknowledge that Congress has not ejected state
laws from a particular field, no federal interests predominate the
field, and the field is not one whose nature requires national uniformity. 338 These cases, however, go on to suggest that an elaborate scheme of federal law promulgated by Congress might
nonetheless be upset by state intrusion. This approach bears a
striking resemblance to the "pervasive scheme" cases; indeed,
the two may easily become intermingled or confused.3 39 In City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,34° the Supreme Court first
found that federal regulation in the disputed area was pervasive,
but then suggested that these regulations had struck a "delicate
balance" between efficiency and safety.3"4 ' The latter consideration, as much as the former, appears to have informed the
Court's finding of preemption.3 4 2
Such indeterminate results may be more than simple intermingling or confusion of two theories: They may be the inevitable result of the premises of the delicate balance approach. The
assumption of the delicate balance cases appears to be that the
fruits of the federal legislative process represent a careful set of
334 See id.

English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80 n.5 (1990).
See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 220-21.
337 See Wolfson, supra note 280, at 76-79.
338 See id.
339 Id. at 82.
340 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
341 411 U.S. at 638.
342 See Wolfson, supra note 280, at 77 n.42.
335
336
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compromises among competing interest groups and that what
has been excluded as a result of long negotiation is surely as important as what has been permitted to become law. 43 This set of
legislative compromises could be upset by states meddling in the
outcome.3 4 4 As one commentator has recently pointed out, however, the effect is the same whether the courts find that Congress
has ousted state legislation from a particular field or find that
states are not ousted, but may not enact any law in that area for
fear of upsetting the balance struck by Congress. 45
The consequence of the latter holding "is to reconvert 'delicate balance' preemption back into 'occupying the field' - that
is, to mark out a minifield that Congress has preempted. 3 46 It
has been suggested that this effect is precisely what occurred in
the area of labor law, where the Court in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations

Comm 'n 34 7 held that Congress's balance among the competing interests of management and labor could not be intruded upon by
the states.3 4 8 Because virtually every state statute touching on
employment might in some way affect this balance, however, the
scope of such "Machinists preemption" was subsequently drastically reduced by the Court, which "instead carved out a small
field for Congress to occupy. ' 349 Indeed, under an alternative
view of the Pacific Gas line of cases, it might be argued that the
Court beat a similar retreat, recognizing a particular balance between safety and economic regulation, but carving out successively smaller fields for Congress in Silkwood and English.35°
C.

Preemption Under the Patent Cases

The brief sketch of preemption outlined above suggests that
decisions in this area are anything but a simple exercise in statutory construction. Rather, they involve complex policy choices
impacting the relationship between the authority of the federal
government and that of the state. As a general rule, cases implicating federal preemption could well have been decided on conSee id. at 77.
344 See id. at 77-78.
343

346

See id. at 82.
Id. at 82.

347

427 U.S. 132 (1976).

348

Id. at 154-55. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.

345

724 (1985).
349 See Wolfson, supra note 280, at 82-83 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 754-58.
350 See supra notes 311-27 and accompanying text.
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stitutional, rather than statutory, grounds,"5 ' and the
constitutional questions potentially at issue are reflected in the
policy choice to be made. This rule holds just as true for cases
concerning federal patent law as for any other body of federal
law. Consequently, preemption in the realm of intellectual property cannot be considered by simply examining the statutes at
issue; the constitutional authority behind the federal patent
scheme must be considered as well.
1. The constitutional argument
Questions regarding the preemptive power of Congress's
patent authority are as old as the question of federal preemption
itself. Gibbons v. Ogden, which gave rise to the dormant commerce
and supremacy doctrines, was in fact a patent case. Prior to the
drafting of the Constitution, the individual states often granted
their own patents to inventors.352 In 1798, New York issued a
patent for a steam powered boat to Robert Livingston, and in
1803 extended the patent for a period of twenty years to Livingston and Robert Fulton. 35 3 In Gibbons, Livingston and Fulton li-

censed their exclusive right to the respondent Ogden, who had
successfully sued in New York state courts to enjoin the appellant
Gibbons from infringing the state patent grant.
On appeal,
Gibbons argued not only that the New York patent impermissibly
interfered with interstate commerce, but that the state patent
grant was preempted by the federal patent power. 35 5 Chief Jus351 See Stanford Note, supra note 255, at 208.
352 See generally, LIPSCOMB, supra note 175, § 1:7, at 52-53; Frank D. Prager, A

History of IntellectualPropertyfrom 1545 to 1787, 26J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 711 (1944); P.J.
Federico, State Patents, 13 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'v 166 (1931); P.J. Frederico, Colonial
Monopolies and Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 358 (1929).
353 See LIPsCOMB, supra note 175, § 1:7, at 50.
354 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 5-7 (1824). Livingston and Fulton
had previously sued James Van Ingen, who was also infringing the state patent
grant, and were similarly successful in New York state courts. Livingston & Fulton
v. Van Ingen, 9Johns. 506 (N.Y. 1812). The New York Court of Appeals reasoned
that the patent right was not repugnant to the federal commerce power and so
could not offend what the court perceived to be the much narrower federal patent
power:
That power only secures, for a limited time, to authors and inventors,
the exclusive privilege to their writings and discoveries; and it is not
granted, by exclusive words, to the United States, nor prohibited to
the individual States, it is a concurrent power which may be exercised
by the individual States, in a variety of cases, without any infringement
of the congressional power.
Id. Cf infra notes 375-82, and accompanying text.
355 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 32-33.
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tice Marshall seized the opportunity to rule on the scope of the
federal commerce power, but declined to reach the patent power
issue. 5 6 Since Gibbons, the tantalizing prospect of a "dormant
patent clause" has remained an unadjudicated possibility, but a
possibility that informs a preemption analysis involving the Patent Clause.
a.

The Patent Clause

The question of the Patent Clause's negative repercussions
is best approached by first considering Goldstein v. California,357 a
case that concerned federal copyright rather than patents, but
which nonetheless holds important implications for interpreting
the scope of the Patent Clause. In addition to granting Congress
the power to issue patents, Article I, section 8 also authorizes
Congress to promote the useful arts by issuing copyrights to authors for their works. In Goldstein, a California state statute
prohibiting unauthorized copying or "piracy" of sound recordings was challenged as constitutionally repugnant under the
Copyright Clause.3 5 8 ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the majority, rejected this argument; the Chief Justice reasoned that the
Constitution permits concurrent state and federal copyright powers, and state regulation was permissible because it would not
inevitably clash with federal interests. 5 9
The Goldstein Court failed to consider the possibility of a different type of constitutional analysis, where state regulation
would be permissible only to the extent that it did not unduly
burden federal interests.3 60 This analysis had been applied previously in Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc.,361 where the
Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois unfair competition provision because for a state "[t]o forbid copying would interfere with
the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution
356 Id. at 186-240. The ChiefJustice explained that "it is unnecessary to enter in
an examination of that part of the [C]onstitution which empowers Congress to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." Id. at 221. See also Crockett, supra
note 208, at 38 (discussing the Gibbons Court's failure to address the patent power).
357 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See also Howard B. Abrams & Robert H. Abrams, Goldstein v. California: Sound, Fury, and Significance, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 147 (1975) (tracing the commerce analysis roots of the Goldstein preemption opinion); Edward
Samuels, Comment, Goldstein v. California: Breaking Up Federal Copyright Preemption,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 966-67 (1974) (same).
358 412 U.S. at 551.
359 Id. at 571.
360 See Bratton, supra note 283, at 640.
361 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and
copyright laws leave in the public domain.

' s 62

Much as it did in

Paul,3 63

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v.
the Court in Compco acknowledged a state's police "power to impose liability upon
those who ... deceive the public by palming off their copies as
the original. '33' The Court, went on to find, however, that the
Illinois law impermissibly burdened the balance of power struck
in the federal constitution.365
It has been argued that Compco's "dormant Patent Clause"
holding, framed at the constitutional level, held the potential to
sweep away all state regulation of ideal goods. 36 6 Under the parallel commerce clause doctrines, however, this result has not occurred: State statutes continue to operate where they effectuate
important state interests and do not overly interfere with the purpose of the constitutional provision.367 This continued operation
is consonant with the post-Compco cases, which balance federal
and state interests and uphold state provisions where they place
no undue burden on the purposes of the Patent Clause.368
The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the legitimacy of
this approach, albeit with some'reservations, in Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.3 6' The Bonito Boats Court invalidated a
Florida statute that prohibited the copying of boat hulls by direct
mold processes. 37

In a decision that drew heavily upon Com-

merce Clause jurisprudence, the Court noted that "[o]ur decisions since [Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 371] and Compco have
made it clear that the Patent and Copyright Clauses do not, by
362 Id. at 237. The Court reached the same result in a companion case decided
the same day. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 132, 144 (1964).
363 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1962).
364 Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
365 Id. at 237-39.
366 See S. Stephen Hilmy, Note, Bonito Boats' Resurrection of the Preemption Controversy: The Patent Leverage Charadeand the Lanham Act "End Around, " 69 TEx. L. REV.
729, 736-37 (1991) (suggesting that the purpose of Sears and Compco was to sweep
away state law of unfair competition). See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989) (discussing the perceived sweep of Sears and
Compco).
367 Cf Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989)
("That the extrapolation of such a broad pre-emptive principle from Sears [and
Compco] is inappropriate is clear from the balance struck in Sears [and Compco]
....
.).
368 See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
369 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
370 Id. at 144, 168.
371 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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their own force or by negative implication, deprive the States of
the power to adopt rules for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions.

' 372

The Court observed,

however, that "[o]ne of the fundamental purposes behind the
Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution was to promote
national uniformity in the realm of intellectual property .... This

purpose is frustrated by the Florida scheme, which renders the
status of the design and utilitarian 'ideas' embodied in the boat
hulls it protects uncertain. ' 37 3 In particular, the Bonito Boats
Court asserted that state laws such as the Florida direct molding
statute burden federal constitutional interests in a manner analogous to that of state laws burdening interstate commerce: "Absent such a federal rule [of uniformity], each State could afford
patent-like protection to particularly favored home industries, effectively insulating them from competition from outside the
3 74
State.

This analysis stands in stark contrast to that in Goldstein,
where the Court asserted that "a copyright granted by a particular State has effect only within its boundaries. If one State grants
such protection, the interests of States which do not are not
prejudiced since their citizens remain free to copy within their
borders those works which may be protected elsewhere. ' 37 1 In
Bonito Boats, the Court clearly shifted away from assessing only
the local interest in protecting ideal goods toward assessing both
the benefits and burdens of such state protection.376 The impor
tation of dormant commerce rationales into Patent Clause jurisprudence emulates the pattern previously followed in non-patent
supremacy cases, heralded by the appearance of concern over dividing the nation into isolated markets.377
b.

Patent Clause construction

Commentary considering the possibility of a dormant Patent
Clause analysis suggests that this approach is forestalled by the
divergent natures of the Commerce and Patent Clauses. The
Commerce Clause, it is argued, was designed to constitute a
U.S. at 165.
373 Id. at 162.
374 Id. at 163.
375 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973).
372 Bonito Boats, 489

See Crockett, supra note 208, at 75-76; Hilmy, supra note 366, at 743.
See Samuels, supra note 357, at 969 (noting that the regulation in Goldstein
"could well be said to discriminate in favor of local economic interests" and "begs
the interstate commerce argument").
376
377
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broad grant of power allowing the federal government to regulate interstate transactions in the national interest; accordingly,
the language of the Commerce Clause does not address the values, purposes or limits to be considered in exercising the commerce power. 378 The Patent and Copyright Clause, by contrast,

is a narrow grant of power that stipulates values and constraints
to be considered in exercising the power granted.3 79 Thus, the
doctrines used to limit state intrusion upon the broad commerce
grant may be inappropriately employed when evaluating the narrow patent grant.
This argument finds some support in Goldstein, where the
Court stated that Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution
"describes both the objective which Congress may seek and the
means to achieve it. The objective is to promote the progress of
science and the arts ....

To accomplish its purpose, Congress

may grant to authors the exclusive right to the fruits of their respective works. ' 3 8 0 Further support in the patent context stems

from the constitutional analysis in Graham v. John Deere, Co. of Kansas City, 381 in which the Court declared that the Patent Clause

grants Congress the power to issue patents subject to the limitation that this power may be used only to promote progress in
science and the arts. 38 2 Any other exercise of the patent power
3 "3

would presumably exceed Congress's constitutional authority.
Although these decisions certainly prescribe the limits of the
patent power, it is not obvious why they should preclude the
functioning of a "dormant patent" analysis within the scope of
those limits. Rather, the boundaries of any negative Patent
Clause should mirror the narrow boundaries of the power
granted.384 For instance, the Patent Clause clearly does not ap378 See Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation,and Preemption: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 509, 527-28 (1984).
379 See id.; Crockett, supra note 208, at 43-44. This characterization of the Patent
Clause was essentially the holding of the New York Court of Appeals in Livingston
& Fulton v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 506 (N.Y. 1812), which the United States Supreme
Court declined to review in Gibbons. See supra note 354.
380 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 555.
381 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
382
383

Id. at 5-6.

See Crockett, supra note 208, at 43-44.
One commentator has argued that the narrowness of the Copyright and Patent Clause may be compared to the foreign affairs power, and so offers a stronger
case for federal exclusivity than does the Commerce Clause. "In contrast to the
nebulous commerce power grant, the 'specific' character of the copyright power
invites an analogy to the relatively circumscribed subject matter of foreign affairs."
See Bratton, supra note 283, at 640 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, the specific char384
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ply to service to patrons at lunch counters, as the Commerce
Clause has been held to do. s8 5 Conversely, although a wide variety of state statutes, such as state tax provisions, may in some way
burden the operation of the federal patent scheme, their operation should fall outside the limits of any negative implication that
the Patent Clause may carry. Where the states legislate squarely
within the patent power's boundaries, as defined by the limiting
language of the Patent Clause, however, the burden placed by
the state statute on the operation of the Patent Clause is appropriately considered at the constitutional level.
c.

Other powers

The argument that the Patent Clause is too narrow to accommodate commerce-type analysis also ignores the extensive
body of case law indicating that Congress may reach a constitutionally authorized goal by any number of constitutionally authorized routes.3 8 6 One can imagine a number of goals arising
under the commerce power that Congress might choose to promote by granting an exclusive right resembling a patent. 8 7 Indeed, patents need not necessarily be granted pursuant to only
one constitutional power; they might well be issued both to proacter of the Patent and Copyright Clause has been suggested to carry greater inherent preemptive capability than the general grant of the Commerce Clause. See
Samuels, supra note 357, at 966.
385 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
386 See generally David E. Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of FederalPower, 45 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 51, 58-68 (1973). Engdahl observed that:
Congress may freely use its enumerated powers as means for the accomplishment of ends extraneous to any of its enumerated powers.
The purpose, objective, or effect is no ground for constitutional objection, so long as the end is sought by means of exercising an enumerated power.
Under this principle, the commerce power as well as other enumerated powers are commonly exercised for ends which are not enumerated by the Constitution but which are within the federal domain.
Id. at 66 (footnotes omitted).
387 Arguably, such an exercise of the commerce power is forbidden because it
would render the Patent Clause superfluous. Cf Crockett, supra note 208, at 43
n.88. It seems clear, however, that results that could be accomplished under one
constitutional power may also be accomplished in the exercise of another constitutional power. Thus, regulation of racial discrimination at lunch counters under the
commerce power apparently is not barred because it would render the civil rights
amendments excessive. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Similarly, regulation of rental prices that could be accomplished under the commerce power may also be accomplished under the war power. See, e.g., Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
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mote science and to exercise some type of control over interstate
commerce.3 8 The Court suggested this possibility in Goldstein:
"Where the need for free and unrestricted distribution of a writing is thought to be required by the national interest, the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause would allow Congress to

eschew all protection. "389
Neither must the grant of a patent be necessarily connected
only to the Patent or Commerce Clauses. Although the Supreme
Court has seldom looked beyond the Commerce Clause to find
constitutional authorization for congressional action, in those
cases where it has done so the scope of permissible action under
other constitutional provisions has been interpreted as broadly
as such action under the Commerce Clause. For example, the
Property Clause3 9 0 has been interpreted as granting to Congress
authority broad enough to reach beyond the territorial limits of
federal lands, even impacting upon private holdings.3 9 ' One can
imagine that Congress, wishing to improve air quality over national parks such as the Grand Canyon, might offer an exclusive
right resembling a patent to the inventors of air pollution control
devices. Similarly, Congress's war power has been held to allow
economic intervention, such as rent control, long after hostilities
have ceased. 9 2 Congress might well exercise this power to offer
a patent-like incentive to persons who invent devices useful to
the national defense.
In each of these examples, the incentive offered by Congress
under the property or war powers is consonant with the Patent
Clause; progress in science and the useful arts is likely to be pro388 Cf Author's League of America, Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986)
(upholding a portion of the Copyright Act under the Commerce Clause); Dowling
v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (holding that copyright power is independent
and Congress may penalize copyright infringement whether or not it impacts interstate commerce); Samuels, supra note 357, at 966 (suggesting that preemptive capability of the Copyright Act must come from the commerce power rather than the
Copyright Clause).
389 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973). See also Samuels, supra note
357, at 966 (discussing possible bases for the Copyright Act in the Commerce
Clause). Cf H.R. Rep. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1977), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746 ("There is no intention [in the Copyright Act] to deal
with the question of whether Congress can or should offer the equivalent of copyright protection under some constitutional provision other than the patent-copyright clause of article 1, section 8.").
390 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Property Clause states that: "Congress
shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .... " Id.
391 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 538-39 (1976).
392 See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141-43 (1948).
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moted together with Congress's other objective. This need not
always be the case. Situations could well arise where the Patent
Clause is not satisfied because Congress offered an exclusive
right that did not promote progress or because Congress promoted progress by offering something other than an exclusive
right. The Atomic Energy Act appears to contain elements of
both such possibilities. Under the Act, inventions relating to military uses of fissile material are removed from patentable subject
matter.3 9 3 A system of prizes and awards is authorized for meritorious research in this area, however. 9 4 In addition, although
patents may issue for inventions relating to civilian uses of fissile
material, such patents are subject to a compulsory license administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 9 5
It is generally conceded that Congress removed nuclear
armaments from patentable subject matter because it judged that
neither national security nor public health and safety would be
well served by encouraging private innovation in that area. 39 6
Presumably, the congressional action taken pursuant to this judgment is legitimate action under the war power, domestic commerce power and even the foreign commerce power. The
Atomic Energy Act's legislative history indicates that the compulsory licensing scheme for domestic patents was instituted to allow widespread access to peacetime nuclear technology, which
would rapidly foster the growth of domestic nuclear power capability.3 9 7 Again, the scheme is presumably a legitimate exercise
of congressional discretion under the commerce power.
Note, however, that these exercises of congressional power
are not necessarily consonant with the generally accepted purposes and constraints of the patent power. By removing nuclear
weapons technology from patentable subject matter, Congress in
some sense intended to discourage invention in that area. As a
comparative matter, the "patents" provided for civilian nuclear
technology would seem to do the same. Such patents are, in essence, no patents at all because the patent holder cannot recap42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1988).
Id. at § 2181 (b).
Id. at § 2183.
S. Rep. No. 122, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N
1327, 1335. See also Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in PatentingNew Animal
Life, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 399, 404 (1988) (discussing congressional purpose for
Atomic Energy Act patent provision).
397 S. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1327, 1328, 1335.
393
394
395
396
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ture her development costs by excluding competitors from using
her invention or bargaining for a license. Rather, she must settle
for whatever royalty is set by a government agency. Thus, in allocating research and development resources, an inventor would
be likely to shift her effort to some other technology where she
could be sure of recapturing her costs.
Additionally, to the extent that the prospect of an award or
prize may offer an incentive to invention in the area of nuclear
weapons technology, it cannot achieve this result pursuant to the
Patent Clause. The constitutional framers considered instituting
a system of awards and prizes as incentives for invention, but rejected that proposal in favor of the present Patent Clause that
authorizes only securing to inventors the exclusive right to their
inventions. 3 98 Any power that Congress possesses to institute a

system of prizes must derive from some other constitutional provision. Thus, in the area of military and civilian nuclear technology, incentives to invent are at least tempered by constitutional
powers lying outside the Patent Clause, and in some instances
appear to be wholly drawn from those other powers.
Similarly, Congress has created a system of market exclusivity to reward pharmaceutical manufacturers who invest capital in
the development and production of drugs that would be beneficial to only a small patient population. 9 9 Without the incentive
of market exclusivity, these "orphan" drugs would presumably
never be available because sales of the product would not be sufficient to recapture the initial costs. 4 0 Thus, both the exclusivity
provision for orphan drugs as well the rationale behind the market exclusivity appear indistinguishable from those in the patent
system. Congressional authority to enact the orphan drug statutes, like the authority to enact a system of nuclear technology
prizes, cannot arise from the Patent Clause, however. Market exclusivity is available for orphan drugs regardless of their obviousness, yet the Court has stated that nonobviousness is a
constitutionally mandated requirement for patentability.4"' Con398 The system of prizes and awards was advocated by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, but the present, limited exclusivity system was adopted instead.
Donald W. Banner, An Unanticipated,Nonobvious, Enabling Portion of the Constitution:
The Patent Provision - The Best Mode, 69J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 631, 637, 639 (1987).
399 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (1992).
400 See H.R. Rep. No. 153, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 301, 303-05. See generally PatriciaJ. Kenney, The Orphan Drug Act - Is
it a Barrierto Innovation? Does it Create Unintended Windfalls?, 43 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J.
667 (1988).
401 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
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gress's authority over orphan drugs must come from some other
source, such as the Commerce Clause, and such sources of au02
thority are certainly susceptible to commerce-type analysis.
2.

The supremacy argument

Despite the potential for resolving questions regarding state
intellectual property law at the constitutional level, the Court has
consistently chosen to resolve such questions at the statutory
level through supremacy analysis. Although this approach has
the virtues of constitutional restraint alluded to above,10 3 it has in
no way simplified the analysis. The standards for supremacy
analysis have never been entirely clear, particularly on the border
between field preemption and conflict preemption. The Court
has recently admitted that these categories are not "rigidly distinct," 4 and often collapse into one another, complicating the
determination of preemption.
Nowhere has this been more true than in the Supreme Court
opinions dealing with state and federal intellectual property law.
In other areas, the Court has at least attempted to maintain the
fiction that these categories involve different standards; this is
not so in its intellectual property cases. The arguments in these
opinions swirl chaotically around one another, admitting of no
easy resolution, and the early cases in this area appear to have
developed largely independent of any reference to the parallel
jurisprudence in other areas of preemption law."0 5 More recently, attempts have been made to square these opinions with
established tests for preemption, but such late reconciliation has
obscured, rather than clarified, the Court's approach to conflicts
with the federal patent system. 0 6
a. Occupying the field
As a general rule, the Court has tended to avoid field preemption as a basis for its decisions on matters involving intellec402 But cf.John J. Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the
Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389 (arguing that the Orphan Drug Act incentives
are impermissible under either the patent or commerce power).
403 See supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
404 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
405 See Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CAL. L. REV.
873 (1971) (discussing the Supreme Court's failure to draw on preemption cases
outside intellectual property area).
406 See Crockett, supra note 208, at 29, 74; Hilmy, supra note 366, at 729; Carol A.
Rogala, Casenote, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 475, 484 (1990).
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tual property. This, however, is not to say that the Court has
been straightforward in its choice of analysis, or that its intellectual property cases are devoid of field preemption language. An
implication of field preemption was found in Sears, Roebuck, & Co.
v. Stiffel Co. ,407 where the Court invoked broad language forbidding state law that would "encroach" on the federal patent system where "uniform federal standards are carefully used to
promote invention ...

40

Such language, reminiscent of the

field preemption cases, was initially believed to signal the end of
all state intellectual property protection.40 9 Yet the Sears Court
cited not a single supremacy case and failed to explicitly apply
the tests for field preemption.41 0 Instead, the Court employed
additional language reminiscent of the conflict preemption cases,
and spoke of forbidding state protection that "clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent laws. "411
This mixture of talismanic language, pointing to both field
and conflict preemption, left commentators and lower courts
confused for some time. 41 2 Without overruling Sears, later opin-

ions opted to analyze similar intellectual property questions in
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
Id. at 230. See also Samuels, supra note 357, at 964 ("The Sears-Compco decisions had rested primarily on a presumption that congressional enactment of any
statute concerning copyrights or patents manifested an intent to preempt the entire
field; indeed, the decisions strongly implied that such absolute preemption might
be constitutionally mandated.").
409 See Goldstein, supra note 405, at 874-75 nn.6, 7 (citing numerous court decisions and scholarly articles); see also supra note 366 and accompanying text.
410 Curiously, the Court instead cited Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317
U.S. 173 (1942) for the proposition that "federal policy 'may not be set at naught,
or its benefits denied' by the state law." Sears, 376 U.S. at 229 (quoting Sola Elec.,
317 U.S. at 176). Sola Electric dealt with the ouster of state estoppel laws by federal
patent policy, but was not a commerce or preemption case. Sola Elec., 317 U.S. at
176. Rather, the case focused on the displacement of state law by federal common
law under the doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Sola
Elec., 317 U.S. at 176-77. See also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715
(1979); Miree v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). Sola Electric belongs to a family of cases quite
distinct from the supremacy or commerce cases, although some striking parallels
exist between the two groups. See Stern supra note 198, at 929 n.l; Wolfson, supra
note 280, at 105-06 n. 198. Only recently, however, has the Court begun to explore
these parallels suggested injustice Black's Sears citation. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1988); see also Wolfson, supra note 280, at
105-06 n.198 (discussing Boyle).
411 Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
412 See Goldstein, supra note 405, at 874-75 nn.6, 7 and sources cited therein (listing contradictory decisions and commentary subsequent to Sears).
407

408
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terms of conflict preemption. 41 3 Recently, however, language
drawn more directly from the field preemption cases resurfaced
in the Bonito Boats decision. Overruling a Florida statute that prohibited copying of boat hulls by direct molding, the Court declared that the state law "enters a field of regulation which the
patent laws have reserved to Congress. '" 4 ' 4 The Court seemingly
applied the test of "pervasiveness" to conclude that field preemption was implicated in its analysis: According to the Bonito
Boats decision, the patent statutes constitute a " 'scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it.'

"415

Despite this manifest field preemption language, the Bonito
Boats decision, like Sears, fails to squarely apply field preemption
analysis. In addition to its field preemption language, Bonito
Boats is rife with allusions to conflict preemption, and the Court
is less than candid as to which flavor of preemption was actually
invoked to strike down the Florida law.4 16 This strange mixture
of standards stems in part from an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile inconsistent previous opinions, including Sears.4 t 7 Yet, any
concession to the rhetoric of field preemption seems astonishing
in light of the Court's established history of reliance upon conflict preemption in intellectual property cases.
b.

Stands as an obstacle

First evident in Goldstein, the Supreme Court's reliance on
conflict analysis as the preferred approach in intellectual property cases became firmly established in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.4 8 The Kewanee case involved a preemption challenge to an
Ohio trade secret law under the Patent and Supremacy Clauses.
Relying heavily on his previous analysis of local copyright interests in Goldstein, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in
Kewanee, rejected out of hand any notion of field preemption
413 See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Aronson
v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
414 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167.
415 Id. at 167 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
416 See Crockett, supra note 208, at 32-33, 74-76.
417 See Hilmy, supra note 366, at 729; David E. Shipley, Refusing to Rock the Boat:
The Sears/Compco Preemption DoctrineApplied to Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 385, 385-86 (1990).
418 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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where the Patent Clause was concerned. 4 19 As in Goldstein, a field
preemption was rejected on the basis of the states' historic interest in fostering local intellectual diversity. 4 20 Because trade secret law was effectively a field "traditionally occupied by the
States," the Court quickly declared that "[t]he only limitation on
the States is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights
they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area
passed by Congress ....
421
Having dismissed the question of field preemption, the
Court then determined whether state trade secret law stood as an
obstacle to the goals of federal patent law. As defined by the
Kewanee Court, such goals were not likely to encounter interference from state trade secret law. The Court began by drawing a
sharp line between patentable and non-patentable subject matter, indicating that Congress had indicated an intent to promote
disclosure of patentable material by offering the patent incentive.4 2 2 The Court reasoned that trade secret law does not conflict with patent law because the former provides a "weaker"
form of protection than does patent law; no rational inventor
would opt for trade secret protection if patent protection were
available.4 23 The Court therefore concluded that trade secret law
is unlikely to divert patentable inventions from disclosure and
eventual entry into the public domain.4 2 4 In addition, the
Kewanee opinion observed that, once ideas are in the public domain, trade secret law is unlikely to conflict with the Congressional goal of keeping those ideas there. 4 25 The Kewanee Court
observed that this policy "is not incompatible with the existence
of trade secret protection. By definition a trade secret has not
4 26
been placed in the public domain.
The standards articulated in Kewanee set the tone for subsequent patent preemption opinions. The Court's more recent
preemption discussion in Bonito Boats purports to adopt the
Kewanee analysis; yet Bonito Boats saw the test of Kewanee subtly
altered to fit the "delicate balance" preemption line of cases.4 2 7
Id. at 479.
Id. See also Abrams & Abrams, supra note 357, at 178-79 (discussing the
Kewanee inquiry into national and local interests as an amplification of Goldstein).
421 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added).
422 Id. at 480-81, 483.
423 Id. at 483, 490.
424 Id. But see sources cited supra note 208 and accompanying text.
425 Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484.
426 Id.
427 See supra notes 337-50 and accompanying text.
419
420
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The Bonito Boats Court declared that "[t]he federal patent system
...embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years. "428 Poised in opposition
to this bargain is an equally carefully crafted determination that
"free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception. 4 2' The states may not
intrude upon this equilibrium: "[S]tate regulation of intellectual
property must yield to the extent that it clashes with the balance
struck by Congress in our patent laws .... Where it is clear how
the patent laws strike that balance in a particular circumstance,
that is not a judgment the States may second-guess."4' 3 0
The Court has been able to grant the widest possible latitude
to state law in the area of intellectual property because of the
Court's repeated designation of intellectual property as an area
where conflict analysis is to be employed; conflict analysis trims
away only particular laws without excluding states from the area
altogether. 4 3 ' This approach makes some sense in Kewanee,
where the Court appeared determined to allow state law as wide
latitude as possible.4 3 2 The approach makes less sense in Bonito
Boats, where it seemed that the Court was determined to eliminate the Florida plug molding statute. Bonito Boats, however,
clearly marks a turning point in intellectual property jurisprudence. As discussed above, the opinion contains not only conflict
preemption language, but also field preemption language. Bonito
Boats may therefore constitute a transitional case, leaving the
door open for ventures into field analysis. 4 33 In juxtaposing language from these two tests, the Court may have been hedging its
bets, including both types of preemption in the opinion in order
to multiply the number of tools available to it in future cases.4 3 4
Where previously only conflict analysis was available to prune
away selected state intellectual property enactments, field pre-
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Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51.
Id. at 151.
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Id. at 152.
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See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
It is not a coincidence that the opinions that accomplished this shift, Goldstein
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432

and Kewanee, were penned by the same author, Chief Justice Burger. The shift in
intellectual property law reflects the Burger Court's overall movement away from
federal dominance of preemption analysis. See Martin, supra note 283; Bratton,
supra note 283.
433 See Crockett, supra note 208, at 76.
434 Id.
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emption seems now available to fence off larger areas of federal
superintendence.
3.

Favored status

The Supreme Court's shifting of the focus of intellectual
property preemption from field to conflict preemption may have
provided state law with a much greater measure of latitude, but
with conflict preemption, the Court may still be confronted with
the prospect of preemption in cases where state law can be said
to directly conflict with federal law. In many instances, the Court
has indicated a reluctance to annul the offending statute and has
employed its wide interpretive leeway to avoid a finding of conflict. Such interpretive maneuvering has been especially apparent in cases involving the relationship of state trade secret law to
federal patent law; in these cases the Supreme Court seems to
indicate that trade secrecy enjoys something of a favored status.
Although other state intellectual property statutes have been sacrificed to federal interests, trade secret law remains inviolate,
even where it seems that the laws struck down are no more objectionable than is trade secrecy. Although both Kewanee and Bonito
Boats attempt to distinguish trade secrecy from the other, objectionable statutes, the opinions' reasoning in this regard is highly
questionable.43 5
First, the assumption that trade secret law will not draw inventions out of the patent system is largely unsupported.43 6 As
discussed above, trade secret law may offer protection of unlimited duration to an invention, whether the invention is otherwise
patentable or not. 43 7 The only criterion for determining whether
to adopt trade secret rather than patent protection is the availability of natural barriers to exclude potential users. Thus, the
availability of trade secret protection may well interfere with the
43 8
patent system's disclosure interest.

Second, the Kewanee opinion tends to play fast and loose with
the term "public domain." According to Kewanee, "the [federal
patent] policy that matter once in the public domain must remain
in the public domain is not incompatible with the existence of
trade secret protection. By definition a trade secret has not been
435 See id. (questioning the reasoning in Bonito Boats); Stern, supra note 198, at
945-47 (questioning the reasoning in Kewanee).
436 See Stern, supra note 198, at 945-47.
437 See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
438 See Stern, supra note 198, at 958.
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placed in the public domain. ' 43 9 Yet definitions are precisely
what the Court ignores, equating the "public domain" for purposes of patent law with the "public domain" for purposes of
trade secrecy. The meaning of this term, however, is quite different in each context. Nonpatentability is not the same as publicity, yet the Court confuses the two concepts. 4 40 An invention
may lie in the "public domain" because it is unpatentable subject
matter, but be withheld from the "public domain" because it is
not public knowledge. Although these two types of "public domain" characteristics may overlap, the Kewanee Court's implication that they are synonymous is flawed.
Third, the Kewanee opinion has been criticized for failing to
address strong national interests that might favor a uniform national system. Kewanee does not discuss national uniformity or
"occupying the field.' ' 1 In arguing for regional intellectual
property interests, the Court ignored the consideration that
neither the states nor the nation are isolated entities, and that in
an international market, intellectual property protection may
only be meaningful when it is at least national in scope. 44 2 The
corollary to this principle was later acknowledged in Bonito Boats:
Regional intellectual property laws effectively divide the nation
into discrete markets, placing virtual burdens on interstate commerce.4 4 3 In neither Kewanee nor Bonito Boats did the Court follow
this insight to its natural conclusion and acknowledge the possible negative impact of state trade secrecy law on competition.4 4 4
Thus, the Court's analysis of potential conflicts with patent
policy has been at best dubious. Its analysis of the benefits of
439 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). See supra notes
418-19 and accompanying text.
440 See Hilmy, supra note 366, at 746-47.
441 See Stern, supra note 198, at 952-53.
442 Id. See also Langdon Jorgensen & Mary McIntyre-Cecil, The Evolution of the
Preemption Doctrine and Its Effect on Common Law Remedies, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 93
(1983) (arguing that Goldstein's regional interests analysis ignored the implications
for national or international markets). An alternative argument might be made on
the basis of the states' strong interest in promoting business ethics, a traditional
function of trade secret law. This argument would closely parallel the Court's discussion of avocado regulations preventing a sort of consumer fraud in Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963). Invoking deference to the
state's police powers, however, would necessitate an exercise, similar to that in Florida Lime, of balancing local health and safety interests against those of national uniformity. This is precisely the type of balancing that the Kewanee Court seemed
eager to avoid: although the maturity of avocados in Florida Lime may not be a matter of national concern, the promotion of economic protections in Kewanee may be.
443 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 163 (1989).
444 See Stern, supra note 198, at 943-44.
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trade secret protection, against which the potential conflict was
balanced, stands on firmer ground. Much of the benefit analysis
in Kewanee and Bonito Boats draws upon the economic character of
trade secrets discussed in Part II above.4 4 5 In Kewanee, the Court
suggested that without trade secret protection, valuable resources might be wasted in security efforts to achieve actual secrecy.4 4 6 Licensing would also be deterred, creating further
resource misallocation as firms attempted to reproduce inventions that would be better licensed.4 4 7 The Court concluded:
Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in this country
for over one hundred years. Each has its particular role to
play, and the operation of one does not take away from the
need for the other. Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent
laws, but which items still have an important part to play in the
technological and scientific advancement of the Nation. Trade
secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of industry; it permits the individual inventor
to reap the rewards of his labor by contracting with a company
large enough to develop and exploit it. Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing
the States to enforce trade secret protection. Until Congress
takes affirmative action to the contrary, States should be free
to grant protection to trade secrets.4 48
In Bonito Boats, the Court expanded upon the economic analysis
of Kewanee to recognize an additional economic function for trade
secrecy. The Bonito Boats Court suggested that trade secret protection might allow development of inventions to a patentable stage,
thus feeding the patent system. 449 The patent system seems to provide for this function of trade secrecy. The Patent Act provides that
information contained in patent applications is to remain confidential unless and until a patent issues. 45" The regulations governing
the Patent and Trademark Office require that pending, unsuccessful, or abandoned applications be maintained in secrecy. 4 5 ' Even
445
446

See supra notes 206-30 and accompanying text.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1974).
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Id.

448
449

Id. at 493.

Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 166. Accord Paul Goldstein, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.: Notes on a Closing Circle, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 81, 92; Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, DethroningLear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV.

677, 689-90 (1986).
450 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988).
451 37 C.F.R. § 14(a), (b) (1989).
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published opinions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences may be excised of trade secret information if one of the par452
ties so requests.
These characteristics of the patent system did not escape notice
in Bonito Boats, where the Court claimed to find "affirmative indications from Congress that both the law of unfair competition and
trade secret protection are consistent with the balance struck by the
patent laws."145 3 Given that preemption analysis is ostensibly a
question of implied legislative intent, .the Kewanee decision likely
overlooked an additional ground from which it might have supported its result: Congress has not been silent "over these many
years" regarding the role of trade secret law.4 54 If the patent
scheme is examined for hints of congressional intent, as has been
done in other cases determining federal preemption, it might well
be argued that the provisions discussed above assume and encourage the continued existence of state trade secret law. If other
federal statutes are considered, Congress has often provided for the
protection of trade secrecy of information given to federal agencies.
Thus, as Justice Marshall observed in his special concurrence in
Kewanee, "Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its full awareness
of the existence of the trade secret system, without any indication of
disapproval. ' 45 5 The question remains whether this tacit approval
will hold true in the context of outer space activity.
III.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN OUTER SPACE

The criteria for preemption analysis announced by the
Supreme Court are less than certain guides even where mundane, terrestrial matters are at issue: "As with other constitu452 Id. at § 14(d).
453 Bonito Boats, 489

U.S. at 166.

454 Crockett, supra note 208, at 36.
455 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring). The case for tacit congressional

approval of state trade secrecy is rather overwhelming; virtually every federal
agency that is given investigatory power is required to preserve the confidentiality
of trade secrets. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (in agency record requests); 7
U.S.C. § 136(h) (1988) (environmental pesticide control); 7 U.S.C. § 2157 (1988)
(Institutional Animal Committee); 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(l) (1988) (in bankruptcy
court); 15 U.S.C. § 1193 (1988) (for flammable fabrics); 15 U.S.C. § 1263 (1988)
(for hazardous substances); 15 U.S.C. § 1401(e) (1988) (National Motor Safety
Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(2) (1992) (Consumer Products Safety Commission); 18
U.S.C. § 1905 (1988) (in criminal investigation); 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (1988) (Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act); 26 U.S.C. § 61 10(c)(4) (1988) (Internal Revenue Service); 29 U.S.C. § 664 (1988) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration); 39
U.S.C. § 4102 (1988) (postal service); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7542(b), 7607(a), 7621(c)
(1988) (air pollution control).
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tional standards, these considerations cannot be applied
4 56
mechanically in most cases to produce sensible decisions.
The prospect for these standards to produce a sensible result
seems even less encouraging where their application is translated
to low Earth orbit. This jurisprudential pessimism may well be
the most important lesson of the preemption cases. The common thread running through all the cases is the absence of a simple, universal solution. As one commentator has stated, "no
single legal or policy consideration can be used universally to distinguish cases of preemption from cases of non-preemption, for
the result must depend upon the particular interests or policies
at stake."'4 5 7 This precept is crucial to an informed analysis of
state and federal interests in outer space. The unique nature of
outer space commercialization, rather than any previously announced preemption test, is likely to determine the best result.
This concept will hold true not only in the consideration of intellectual property law, but also in determining the mechanics of
other emerging legal questions.
A.

Intellectual Property

At the most rudimentary level, the answer to whether state
trade secret law should operate in outer space could be a simple
one. The Supreme Court has declared in Kewanee and Bonito
Boats that a trade secret enjoys something of a favored status; it
exists alongside the patent as a viable form of intellectual property protection. If the rule of Kewanee controls, then the inquiry
need not proceed further and the gap in outer space trade secret
law may be filled by the enactments of individual states. The circumstances attending any application of state law to outer space
activity diverge so widely from those considered in Kewanee, however, that the rule of the case may no longer fit the facts. A new
derivation of the rule is in order. The considerations articulated
in Kewanee and Bonito Boats may still guide the analysis, but the
outcome may be different in a new milieu.
1.

Narrowing the field

Using the supremacy cases as a guide, the first step in reconsidering Kewanee for outer space might be to ask whether the field
at issue encompasses all aspects of federal patent law, or a more
limited subset of its applications. As the Pacific Gas line of cases
456
457

See Hirsch, supra note 257, at 549.
See Stem, supra note 198, at 941.
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suggests, continued operation of state law in a particular field
does not mean that there are no federal enclaves where state law
may not intrude.4 58 Or, from the Machinists perspective, a "minifield" of federal supremacy may still have to be staked out within
the larger field originally considered. 4 5 9 Even if state law may as

a general matter continue to operate alongside federal patent
law, it may be barred from intruding on the federal function in
the international environs of outer space.
One consequence of narrowing the field in this manner is
that the Court's requirement that Congressional intent to preempt be "clear and manifest" most likely becomes inapplicable.4 60 Although it is the states that, in general, have been
involved in the regulation of trade secrets, it may be difficult to
claim that such regulation has ever been a traditional area of
state interest for activities occurring beyond Earth's atmosphere.
The states' interest in activities far beyond their borders is not
unknown, as evidenced by some cases allowing prosecution or
adjudication of activity aboard ships on the high seas. 46 ' States
may also be concerned with protecting the investments of local
businesses that engage in outer space research or controlling the
ethics and conduct of corporations that do business within their
borders. 462 This interest may be particularly pronounced for
states such as Florida, Texas and California, where representatives of firms engaging in outer space research are likely to conduct some operations. As the situs of a corporation's activity
becomes farther removed from a state's terrestrial borders, however, so too must the state's assertion of "local concern" become
more and more attenuated.
Thus, the Kewanee-Goldstein rationale of local concern will
carry far less force in the outer space context, and the focus of
preemption analysis will shift to federal concerns. Working
through the strange exercise of seeking implied congressional intent regarding preemptive purposes, a court might begin by assessing a possible preemptive intent in the Patents in Space Act.
See supra notes 311-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)
461 See, e.g., Thompson v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 419 So. 2d 822 (La.
1982); North Pacific Steamship Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of California,
163 P. 199 (1917).
462 "The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement
of invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law." Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
458
459
460
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The statute's legislative history would be a likely place to look for
indications of such intent. But, not surprisingly, the Act's legislative history is almost entirely devoid of any discussion of the
question. The committee reports accompanying the statute state
pointedly and repeatedly that the purpose of the Act is to extend
the ambit of United States patent law to activities aboard United
States spacecraft.4 6 3 The reports do not discuss how the new law
is to interact with any other existing intellectual property provision, however.
The sole reference to state law in general, and trade secret
law in particular, appears in the report of a hearing regarding an
early version of the Patents in Space bill before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice. In response to a question from Representative
Kastenmeier, Chair of the Subcommittee, as to the potential legal
problems that might have to be resolved, the witness, law professor Glenn H. Reynolds, replied:
Well, one of the problems we have is that we don't entirely know, but I can give you a few examples, maybe. One is
the relationship of state laws to space activity. Many areas of
law having to do with employer-employee relationships, or
also things like trade secrets, are really state law.
There is no rule for determining whether state law should
apply to activities in space other than general conflict of law
rules; if so, which state's law should apply? . . . I called up

Roger Milgrim in New York, who is the author of a leading
treatise on trade secrets and who knows much more about the
subject than I do, and he confessed that he found it a rather
puzzling problem as well ..

464

Consequently, the history of the relevant federal legislation is
unlikely to provide much assistance in assessing preemption.
Where the statute's legislative history is devoid of hints as to congressional purposes, the Supreme Court has turned to other indicators, such as the pervasiveness of the federal scheme.4 6 5 Where
outer space activity is concerned, however, this procedure may not
be helpful. Congress has legislated extensively on the general subject of patents generally, of course, and administrative regulations
governing the minute details of patent application, examination and
issue extend even farther. 4 66 The extensive scheme of federal regu463
464
465
466

S. Rep. No. 266, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6 (1990).
1989 Hearing, supra note 22, at 79.
See, e.g., Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
See supra notes 450-55 and accompanying text.
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lation seems unlikely to serve as an indicator of legislative intent for
outer space patents: the question of a pervasive scheme was completely ignored by the Kewanee Court, which skated past field preemption to reach the test for conflict preemption.4 6 7 When the
potential field of preemption is limited to that of the Patents in
Space Act, the extent of federal regulation comprises an even
poorer guide. It cannot be said that Congress has so occupied the
field of outer space intellectual property protection that no room
remains for the operation of state law. Congress has barely visited
the field at all. The lack of federal attention to this field may in fact
militate toward allowing state trade secret law to function; previously observed, trade secret law tends to play an important complementary role in patent protection, and its preemption would leave
"a substantial legal vacuum" where it normally operates.4 6
2.

Standing as an obstacle

An alternative approach to outer space trade secrets, the one
more traditionally applied to intellectual property, would be to
consider the operation of state law through the lens of conflict
preemption. Rather than denying the entire field of outer space
commercial activity to state trade secret law and leaving a legal
vacuum, the conflict preemption standard would permit state law
to operate except where it actually conflicted with federal purposes.469 Because, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
these categories of preemption are not "rigidly distinct,"4 7 ° the
considerations discussed above in terms of field preemption are
likely to suggest a similar result under conflict preemption.
Although application of conflict preemption signals a closer scrutiny of a statute's purpose, it is not immediately clear that the
result will be different than that under a tightly focused field preemption inquiry.
Thus, if it cannot be readily said that Congress has "occupied the field" of outer space intellectual property protection,
neither can it be readily said that application of state trade secret
law to outer space activity be said to "stand as an obstacle" to
congressional intent. The committee reports accompanying the
legislation are replete with statements of the purposes that Congress intended to accomplish by amending the patent statutes:
467 See supra notes 419-21 and accompanying text.
468 Cf TRIBE, supra note 231, § 6-27, at 497.

469 See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
470 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990).
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[The Patents in Space Act] should clearly demonstrate congressional intent with respect to the patent law as applied to
activities in outer space. [The Act] is intended to extend the
protection of U.S. patent law to applicable activities conducted
in outer space. It is anticipated that the clarification of the intellectual property law will significantly 4 encourage
scientific
71
discovery and innovation in outer space.
Arguably, the operation of state trade secret law in outer space
would frustrate neither the goal of extending United States patent
law to outer space activity nor that of encouraging discovery and
innovation in space. Under the Kewanee rationale, it could be argued
that the availability of trade secret law is not likely to interfere with
the operation of patent law aboard United States spacecraft. Indeed, because of the practical difficulty of maintaining any type of
confidentiality aboard the space station, researchers would probably
prefer the certainty of patent protection where it is available. As to
the encouragement of discovery and innovation, we have seen that
trade secrecy fulfills a different role than does patent law. 4 72 By filling this role, state trade secret law may well aid in fostering outer
space research and innovation. If anything, a lack of state trade secrecy law seems more likely to inhibit research than will the presence of state trade secret law. Consequently, preemption of state
law might serve here to frustrate the stated congressional goals,
rather than to further them.
However much this discussion suggests that state law be allowed to operate, an analysis oriented to a different set of congressional goals could well lead to the opposite result. One stated goal
of extending patent protection to outer space activity was to clarify
intellectual property law so as to encourage private investment in
outer space activity. 4 73 The legislative history of the Patents in
Space Act reflects congressional concern that private investment
might not occur if uncertainty of reward were further exacerbated
by lack of intellectual property protection.4 7 4 Uncertainty and a resultant reluctance to invest might stem from the absence of patent
or trade secret protection. If state law is allowed to operate alongside federal law aboard the space station, uncertainty might just as
S. Rep. No. 266, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990).
See supra notes 206-30 and accompanying text.
See S. Rep. No. 266, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990); Statement on Signing the Bill
Ensuring the Applicability of Patent Law to Activities in Outer Space, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
471
472
473

PRES. Doc. 1828 (Nov. 5, 1990).
474 See 1985 Hearing,supra note 16, at 1; H.R. No. 788, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1,

1-2 (1986); H.R. No. 51, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 1-2 (1986); S. Rep. No.
266, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990).
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likely stem from the possibility of being subject to the requirements
of fifty jurisdictions' differing trade secret rules. The potential for
uncertainty suggests the need for a uniform rule regarding intellectual property. Arguably, Congress has provided the uniform rule
through its outer space patent legislation, and unless and until Congress addresses protection for intellectual property that is not patentable, any other rule should be preempted.
The need for a single rule is even more compelling when the
space station's multinational character is considered.4 7 5 For any
given project, nationals from various partner countries may work on
proprietary research. Separate aspects of a particular project may
be pursued in modules on the registry of different partner nations,
or the project may be moved from module to module at various
times. 4 76 Thus, under the IGA governing the space station, any
given research project may become subject to the intellectual property laws of the United States, Japan and the thirteen members of
the European Space Agency. The possibility that activity in the
United States module might be subject to fifty different sets of trade
secret laws adds to the potential for confusion and uncertainty.
Moreover, in this area, state law could tread dangerously near
the powers exclusively within the federal purview. The Supreme
Court has more than once invalidated state laws that burdened or
impinged upon Congress's powers concerning foreign treaties or
foreign commerce.4 7 7 These powers are certainly implicated where
commercial activity aboard a multinational space station is contemplated. To date, at each crucial juncture during the planning of the
Freedom, the United States has had to proceed cautiously to avoid
insulting or alienating one or another of its partners in the space
station coalition. 4 7 ' Negotiations for major international agreements such as the Freedom IGA tend to be particularly tricky, and
major issues are often left unresolved because the partners were unable to agree on a solution.4 7 ' The jurisdictional patchwork of the
IGA, in fact, represents a difficult compromise necessitated by the
475 The same, of course, may be said for other multinational space projects, such
as the Spacelab missions. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
476 See Reynolds, supra note 137; Meyer, supra note 105, at 343.
477 SeeJapan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
478 For example, Congressional wrangling over the United States' budget for the
space station has been a source of some irritation to other participants, requiring
considerable diplomacy to smooth over. See Eliot Marshall, Space Station Science: Up
in the Air, 246 Sci. 1110, 1111 (1989).
479 See, e.g., McCord, supra note 63, at 1947 (discussing unresolved choice-of-law
issues).
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participating nations' reluctance to allow the law of any other nation
40
to dominate the project.
This aspect of the Freedom IGA is underscored by the concern,
found throughout the legislative history of the Patents in Space Act,
to avoid impinging upon other nations' sovereignty. The Supreme
Court declared that United States patent law does not contain an
extraterritorial effect, in part to avoid offending the sovereignty of
other nations. 48 ' Although no nation holds sovereignty over outer
space, many of the nations participating in the Freedom project exhibited concern over the potential sweep of the Patents in Space
Act, prompting the introduction of limiting language into both the
legislative history and the Act itself.48 2 Introduction of a variety of
state trade secret laws into this web of considerations could well upset the "delicate balance" worked out by Congress and federal
agencies with the United States' international partners. 48 3 Thus, if
Congress has drawn a balance, it might be considered a balance between fostering commercial development in outer space and respecting the interests and sovereignty of the United States' partners
in the Freedom project, rather than a balance between the operation
of federal and state intellectual property law.
B.

Resolving the Dilemma

Thus far, the application of preemption analysis to outer
space activity seems to present something of a conundrum where
trade secret law is concerned: Application of state laws may frustrate congressional intent with regard to foreign relations, but
failure to apply the laws may equally frustrate congressional intent to commercialize space. This problem is not unique to matters of intellectual property law. Other potential questions of
outer space law have received little or no federal attention and
could require an analysis similar to that detailed here.
1.

Similar legal problems

Federal preemption is a potential issue in any area of outer
space law where federal legislation is sparse and state law is readily available to fill the void. This dynamic is true, for example, in
the area of outer space criminal law. Criminal acts aboard United
480 See, e.g., Oosterlinck, supra note 63, at 28 (noting that dominance of U.S. patent law "is unacceptable to the other partners .... ")
481 Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
482 See Burk, supra note 20, at 345-49.
483 See supra notes 337-45 and accompanying text.

634

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:560

States spacecraft were initially covered by military-style regulations that relied heavily upon the authority of the spacecraft commander's authority to maintain discipline.48 4 As more civilian
astronauts became involved in outer space missions, however,
regulations designed to govern the conduct of a few "highly
trained and disciplined NASA astronauts carrying out closely supervised tasks" were deemed inadequate to cover all possible
contingencies.4 8 5 Congress therefore added spacecraft to the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.4 8 6 This provision subjects certain criminal acts, such as
assault, rape, robbery, arson or embezzlement, to federal law if
the acts occur aboard a United States spacecraft after the doors
have been sealed for liftoff and before they are unsealed after
4 87
landing.
The federal criminal scheme is not comprehensive, however,
and often relies upon state criminal law to fill in gaps. 488 In addition, concurrent jurisdiction of both federal and state statutes is
both acceptable and common. 4 8 9 But where outer space activity
is concerned, the applicability of state criminal law is less than
certain. States may assert jurisdiction on the same bases as nations do, including territoriality, citizenship, universality and
others.4 90 In certain situations, both state and federal criminal
law may cover activity aboard a spacecraft, such as before the
doors are sealed prior to liftoff or when the doors are unsealed
after landing. 49 1 Under principles of nationality or protection, a
state might also assert jurisdiction over activity in outer space involving its citizens or impacting upon its interests.49 2
The preemptive effect of United States criminal law in outer
space is as uncertain as the question of criminal jurisdiction in
outer space. The United States Criminal Code contains an express savings clause providing that nothing in that title of the
484

485
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487

18 U.S.C. § 799 (1988); 14 C.F.R. § 1214 (1989).
See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 43.
18 U.S.C.A. § 7(6) (West Supp. 1992).
Id. See generally Karen Robbins, Comment, The Extension of United States Criminal

Jurisdiction to Outer Space, 23

SANTA CLARA
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627 (1983).

See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1988) (applying state criminal law to federal enclaves). See
also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.8(a)(2) (2d ed.
488

1986) (discussing federal enclaves).
489

See generally

LAFAVE

& SCOTT, supra note 488, § 2.8(d), at 125-26 (discussing

concurrent federal and state jurisdiction).
490 Id. at § 2.9 (discussing bases of state jurisdiction).
491
492

See Robbins, supra note 487, at 649-50.
See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 488, § 2.9(c), at 135-36 (discussing state exer-

cise of protective and citizenship jurisdiction).
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United States Code shall impair the jurisdiction of the States.49 3
This provision, however, has not been interpreted to mean that
federal law cannot preempt state criminal law where national interests are at stake. For example, the state statute held to have
been preempted in Pennsylvania v. Nelson was a criminal statute.494
Tort law comprises an additional area of uncertainty. The
international Liability Convention provides that nations are responsible for claims brought by third parties; this principle is recognized by the IGA governing the space station.49 5 The IGA also
establishes a limited cross-waiver among the participating nations, but claims for personal injury or death and for willful misconduct are not covered.4 9 6 Thus, a variety of tort issues remain
unaddressed, and unlike intellectual property or criminal law, no
federal legislation touching on these issues has ever been enacted. In a terrestrial setting, state tort law would apply, but
commentators have asserted that application of state tort law to
outer space activity would undermine federal interests.49 7 The
suggested alternative has been to extend the Federal Tort Claims
Act to outer space; 498 but this extension, of course, would not
resolve the question of state law applicability - it would only
raise the same preemption questions seen in intellectual property
and criminal law.
2.

Possible solutions

Besides intellectual property, criminal law and tort law, numerous other examples of outer space law are likely to raise
questions of federal preemption. Initially, the answer to the conundrum posed here might seem to be congressional action to
fill in those substantive legal areas, such as trade secrecy, that
seem devoid of rules for outer space activity. Legislative action
may not be the best solution, however, and cannot be the whole
solution. It is not realistic to expect Congress to attend to all the
many areas of law that might apply to outer space activity. Congress is not likely to lend that much attention to a single area
unless some crisis demands such a focus. Even were Congress to
493 See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988).
494 See supra note 303 and accompanying text; see also LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note
488, § 2.15(b), at 187 n.27.
495 See generally McCord, supra note 63, at 1955-57 (discussing IGA tort provisions); Stewart, supra note 63, at 759-62 (same).
496 See generally McCord, supra note 63, at 1955.
497 Id. at 1956.
498

Id.
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devote the time necessary to enacting a comprehensive space
code, it probably could not anticipate all the situations that may
arise in such a developing area of human endeavor. 499 The question of how and whether to fill those gaps with available state law
would remain. This result will be true whether Congress enacts a
comprehensive outer space code or simply addresses a few selected areas: The preemption question would remain. In fact,
new federal legislation is just as likely to generate preemption
questions as to resolve them.
a.

Express language

It might be argued that Congress could forestall these questions by explicitly indicating whether or not state law was to be
permitted to operate in a given area of outer space law. But, as
suggested above, such explicit statutory language is no more
than one factor to be considered in preemption analysis.5 0 0 This
concept is aptly illustrated by the difficulty courts have encountered in determining the scope of express language in current
federal intellectual property statutes. The federal patent statutes
as presently constituted contain neither express preemption language nor a savings clause; consequently, questions regarding
such enactments's scope have not yet arisen at the interface of
patent and trade secret. Both types of problems have arisen,
however, at the interface of trade secret and federal copyright
law.
Under the federal copyright statutes, Congress expressly
provided for preemption of state laws that confer protection
"equivalent" to that of federal copyright, but explicitly saved
state laws that confer protection "not equivalent" to that of federal copyright. 50 ' This language has left federal courts scrambling to determine what is or is not equivalent to copyright.50 2 In
general, the courts have applied an "extra element" test requiring the state cause of action to include some factor, not found in
a cause of action for copyright infringement, that "qualitatively
499 See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 57.
500 See supra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.

17 U.S.C. § 301 (a), (b) (1988).
See generally 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.01 [B] (1992); Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and
Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107 (1977) (discussing history and ramifications of 17 U.S.C. § 301 preemption language).
501
502
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distinguishes" the nature of the action from that of copyright.5 °3
For fraud, the additional element might be deception; for contract, the requirement of a promise; or for breach of trust, a fiduciary relationship.50 4 Where trade secrecy is concerned, this
approach has produced decidedly mixed results: In some cases
been enough to avert preempthe requirement of secrecy 50has
6
tion,505 in others it has not.

Thus, explicit statutory language in and of itself is unlikely to
remove the uncertainty surrounding the potential operation of
state law in outer space. This realization does not mean that congressional attention to outer space law is not needed and would
not go some distance toward resolving the problem. The existence of federal statutes in a given area of outer space law would
at least remove one of the major considerations favoring the operation of state law: the development of a "legal vacuum" that
neither state nor federal law could touch. Additionally, explicit
statutory language as to preemption would at least serve as an
indicator or starting point for judicial analysis.
b.

Federal common law

Ultimately, however, it is the courts that will consider each
new question of outer space law and weigh whether state law is to
be allowed to function.50 7 Interpretation is, of course, the role of
the courts, and takes place wherever a legislative enactment is
applied.50 8 This role, however, becomes particularly important
in the type of situation examined here, i.e., where critical statutory gaps need to be filled. Beginning with whatever can be determined about legislative intent, courts extrapolate from the
text of a statute, attempting to reach an optimal balance of social
interests.
503 See, e.g., Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (explaining the "extra element" test).
504 See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 502, § 1.01[B][l][b], at 1-17.
505 See, e.g., M. Bryce & Assocs., Inc. v. Gladstone, 319 N.W.2d 907 (Wis. Ct. App.
1982).
506 See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 894 (M.D. Ala.
1980) (federal copyright preempted trade secret claim because latter required no
additional elements).
507 "[Tlhe inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts." United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973).
508 Id. See also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1717 (1991)
(federal courts bear responsibility for developing novel federal rules for incorporating state law into federal rules of decision).
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In some instances, the material with which a court must work
is quite sparse; for example, in the area of antitrust, a statute that
is a few words long has been parlayed into a rich body of case
law. 50 9 The corpus of federal preemption doctrine examined

here has in fact been compared to antitrust law, where balancing
is employed to resolve some questions and key indicators determine the outcome of others.51 0 Of course, unlike antitrust law,
preemption is generally a matter of constitutional interpretation,
rather than statutory adjudication. Still, concern that the court
performing this expanded interpretive function might be overstepping the bounds of its authority is generally unwarranted;
"judicial intervention in this sphere [of preemption analysis] is
.. less problematic than in other constitutional realms" because
51
of the possibility of corrective congressional revision. '
Consequently, even in the absence of express language regarding federal preemption, judicial review should serve adequately to determine whether in a given instance the application
of state law to outer space activity is in the best interests of the
nation. Curiously enough, federal courts are also well positioned
to resolve the more serious deficiency of substantive law that
generates the need for state law to be applied, i.e., the lack of a
federal space code.512 Although the Supreme Court has held
that "[t]here is no federal general common law,"' 5 13 federal

courts clearly have power to create common law in specific areas
where uniquely federal interests are at stake. 514 These uniquely
federal interests include international relations such as those involved in outer space activity.515 Thus, the same concerns that
509 "[T]he common law process of law making was both intended by the antitrust
enactments and has occurred." AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 261, at 15. The operative portion of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that -[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
.... 15 U.S.C.. § 1 (1988). The relevant portions of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Clayton Act are similarly brief. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 261, at
14.
510 See Stern, supra note 198, at 930.
511 TRIBE, supra note 231, § 6-2, at 404.
512 See Elizabeth A. Pucciarelli, Note, The Casefor a Federal Common Law of Space, 33
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 509 (1988); Reynolds, supra note 81, at 27-28; Reynolds, supra
note 2, at 11.
513 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
514 See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943).
515 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-24 (1964)
(applying federal common law to an international dispute because the issues were
"uniquely federal in nature"). See also Pucciarelli, supra note 512, at 520-22 (dis-
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favor barring state law from operating in outer space also sanction allowing federal courts to fill the resulting legal "vacuum."5 16 A federal common law approach to outer space law
also offers the advantage of flexibility in a rapidly changing and
expanding area. Those practicing in the area of outer space law
have suggested that the only thing worse than no substantive law
for outer space would be a code enacted too quickly, before
problems and legal standards that might be unique to the outer
space environment become apparent. 51 7 Rather than turning its
attention to a comprehensive - or even piecemeal - outer
space code, Congress might do better to vest explicitly the federal courts with authority to hear matters of outer space law.51 8
CONCLUSION

The promise of commercial gain is already spurring increased private activity in outer space, and the trend is likely to
continue. With this trend comes the need for clear rules to govern outer space activity, but at present few such rules exist.
Trade secrecy constitutes but one of the areas unaddressed by
cussing federal common law and international relations). Pucciarelli argues that
the development of federal maritime law is an appropriate model for development
of a federal common law of outer space. Maritime law is often raised as an analogy
to outer space law. Id. at 526. Federal jurisdiction of maritime matters is expressly
provided for in the Constitution, however; there is no similar provision for outer
space jurisdiction. See Reynolds, supra note 81, at 27. The common thread between
these two jurisdictional areas is international relations, an area of concern clearly
dedicated to federal superintendence by the Constitution. Id. at 27-28. International relations, then, seems to be the proper federal concern to examine when
suggesting an active role for federal courts in outer space.
516 See supra note 410.
517 See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 55-56. The disadvantage to the
common law approach, of course, is that "[c]ommon law doctrines, much like a
pointillist painting, resolve themselves bit by bit into a discernible pattern over
time." Dan L. Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMETRiCS J.
469, 528 (1989) (discussing use of the common law to resolving disputes regarding
new technologies). That rulemaking by this method is responsive rather than anticipatory may create some uncertainty for those embarking on commercial space ventures. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 5, at 56-57. Much of this
inclusiveness likely could be alleviated, however, by resolving who has authority to
make the rules-the federal courts. See Reynolds, supra note 81, at 27-29.
518 See Reynolds, supra note 81, at 28-29. As indicated here, the federal courts
probably already have the authority to create such a federal common law of outer
space, working from present statutes and the strong federal interests in the area.
An explicit grant of authority, however, might solve several jurisdictional questions,
particularly regarding venue. Cf id. (discussing possible venue of outer space
courts). In addition, a grant of exclusive jurisdiction would shunt outer space matters to the federal, rather than the state, courts. Cf supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
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current federal law on outer space. Although state law is available to address these areas, state law may contain features inimical to national interests. Such a dilemma suggests the need for
federal action, but feasibility and allure of a comprehensive outer
space code presently are questionable. Rather, it may be most
appropriate to allow outer space law to advance as common law.
Congress could best facilitate this progress by an explicit grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts.

